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The rapid growth of Cloud based services on the Internet invited many critical 
security attacks. Consumers and corporations who use the Cloud to store their data 
encounter a difficult trade-off of accepting and bearing the security, reliability, and 
privacy risks as well as costs in order to reap the benefits of Cloud storage. The 
primary goal of this thesis is to resolve this trade-off while minimizing total costs. 
This thesis presents a system framework that solves this problem by using erasure 
codes to add redundancy and security to users’ data, and by optimally choosing 
Cloud storage providers to minimize risks and total storage costs. Detailed 
comparative analysis of the security and algorithmic properties of 7 different erasure 
codes is presented, showing codes with better data security comes with a higher cost 
in computational time complexity. The codes which granted the highest configuration 
flexibility bested their peers, as the flexibility directly corresponded to the level of 
customizability for data security and storage costs. In-depth analysis of the risks, 
benefits, and costs of Cloud storage is presented, and analyzed to provide cost-based 
and security-based optimal selection criteria for choosing appropriate Cloud storage 
providers. A brief historical introduction to Cloud Computing and security principles 
is provided as well for those unfamiliar with the field. 
The analysis results show that the framework can resolve the trade-off problem by 
mitigating and eliminating the risks while preserving and enhancing the benefits of 
using Cloud storage. However, it requires higher total storage space due to the 
redundancy added by the erasure codes. The storage provider selection criteria will 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the rise of Cloud Computing has given internet users a host of 
freedoms never enjoyed before. One such freedom is the ability to store files on the 
Cloud through a Cloud storage service provider, and retrieve it anywhere else in the 
world when the user authenticates to the service. It is increasingly being used as a 
repository for storing back up data. In team settings, Cloud storage lets teams 
synchronize and organize all kinds of shared data. For start-ups and small 
corporations, the use of Cloud storage in conjunction with Cloud Computing 
platforms reduces the need to invest in hardware equipment up front, allowing many 
new ideas to be developed into full scale products and large corporations. While 
Cloud storage services are numerous and on the rise, there are still many security, 
economic, and reliability issues associated with utilizing the Cloud as a storage 
medium. 
Attacks such as the one aimed at Dropbox as recent as 2011 have allowed anyone on 
the internet to download any file stored and hosted by Dropbox for a 4 hour time 
period [1]. The attackers exploited a bug in Dropbox’s authentication mechanism. 
Another attack aimed at Amazon S3 storage service in 2011 exploited vulnerabilities 
within the authentication mechanism of Amazon.com, which also allowed 
researchers access to data stored in S3 [2]. Cloud storage service providers remain a 
high value target for many attacks as the general public and users of the internet are 
unaware of the potential risks of using a Cloud storage service.  
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Cloud storage providers encounter numerous problems in their operation that 
results in service outages or even data loss for its users. These include power 
outages, natural disasters, hard disk or server failures, maintenance work, and 
administrative mistakes. Users who store data on the Cloud must depend on reliable 
storage services. As such, reliability remains a key concern for using a Cloud storage 
service. 
Cloud storage service providers employ tier-based pricing to charge users for storing 
files on their Clouds. Most providers offer an initial free storage tier with a capacity 
limit that usually suffices for individual consumers, but companies will quickly 
outgrow the capacity limit. The lowest surveyed storage cost is at $0.05 per GB per 
month, offered by Google Drive. For consumers and companies, there are also costs 
and bandwidth limitations associated with internet service providers since almost all 
Cloud services are accessed through the internet. The lowest surveyed home internet 
connection cost is $0.10 per GB transferred. Competition between storage providers 
leads to a marketplace with ever changing storage pricing. Some storage providers 
also charge a fee to download data off its Cloud. To take advantage of lower long 
term storage costs, users must pay a relatively expensive fee in order to download 
and upload their data from an expensive storage provider to a cheaper provider. 
Literature refers this as a storage vendor lock-in, where it can be cost prohibitive to 
move away from a storage provider once a user or organization commits to using the 
services of that provider. Optimizing the total storage costs alone is a challenging 
dynamic problem, but coupled with the security requirements and reliability 
requirements it becomes a very challenging problem. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
3 
The central contribution of this thesis is a Framework for resolving the security and 
economic problems of using the Cloud as a storage medium while preserving all of 
its benefits. The Framework is a high level design of a secure storage system for the 
Cloud, from a consumer point of view. It is meant to be a guiding template for 
software designers whom wish to design and implement a secure storage platform or 
system. The Framework adopts the approach by Abu-Libdeh, Princehouse, and 
Weatherspoon [3] of using erasure code algorithms to split and join files to add a 
layer of reliability and security to the files. The thesis presents an in-depth analysis 
of the approach, comparative analysis of applicable erasure code algorithms, and the 
design and analysis of the Framework. The Framework provides a number of 
improvements upon the work by Abu-Libdeh et al. 
1.1 THESIS ROADMAP 
The thesis is written in a manner that is hopefully accessible and interesting to a 
broad range of readers from different backgrounds, including internet users, network 
and security researchers, and software systems designers. Background knowledge of 
statistics at the level of a second year university course is helpful in understanding 
parts of the thesis, although not essential to digest the main ideas.  
Internet users will want to begin their exploration at Chapters 2 and 3 to gain an in-
depth understanding and appreciation of the technology and issues surrounding 
Cloud Computing and Cloud Storage, and the value of data. It also prepares readers 
new to the field with the knowledge of the security principles that cryptologists and 
network security specialists use every day to design secure systems. Network and 
security researchers will enjoy Chapter 5 and 6, which shows how erasure codes can 
be used to solve the problem at hand along with their performance and security 
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properties. Software system designers will enjoy Chapters 6, and 7 which present the 
Framework and compare it against traditional paradigms of remote data storage. 
1.2 CHAPTER DESCRIPTIONS 
This thesis is organized into 8 chapters as follows: 
 Chapter 2 introduces Cloud Computing, Cloud Storage, Secure and Reliable Storage 
Principles, and the Value of Data. 
 Chapter 3 presents a thorough examination of the benefits, risks, and costs of 
using the Cloud as a storage medium.  
 Chapter 4 presents a concrete problem statement for using the Cloud as a storage 
medium. 
 Chapter 5 presents the approach and research work by Abu-Libdeh, along with the 
author’s analysis of how the approach resolves the economic, security, and 
reliability problems, and how it retains the benefits of using Cloud as a storage 
medium. 
 Chapter 6 presents the Cloud storage Framework, an in-depth analysis of various 
erasure codes which can be used in the Framework, a storage provider selection 
algorithm for the Framework, and a method for handling the metadata used within 
the Framework. 
 Chapter 7 compares this Framework to traditional remote data storage paradigms. 




CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
Cloud Computing has an interesting history of sparse and sporadic development, 
which have only come together in its modern incarnation starting in year 2000. Like 
other important technologies that have defined and revolutionized computing, Cloud 
Computing is steeped in fundamental works dating as far back as the 1950s in the 
formative stages of computer science. In time, new generations of scientists and 
engineers built upon prior work to cause the right and necessary conditions for 
Cloud Computing to birth in the 21st century. Like other computational 
methodologies, Cloud Computing brings unique values to the table and has its equal 
shares of security challenges. In modern times where the internet is experiencing 
exponential grown in the amount of data it is receiving and processing every day, the 
security issues become ever more important. The value of data also grows, as more 
data are being mined, analyzed, and reduced into useful knowledge. This chapter 
introduces readers to Cloud Computing, Cloud Storage, Secure and Reliable Storage 
Principles, and the Value of Data to help readers establish a broad context and 
understanding of the technology, its value, and the security challenges in modern day 
Cloud Computing. We also introduce Finite Field mathematics in the last section of 
the chapter, to help prepare readers for the technical discussions later in the thesis. 
2.1 CLOUD COMPUTING 
Cloud Computing is the paradigm of internetworked computing whereby vast 
amounts of computing resources are pooled together and subdivided into units of 
resources to service user and workload requests, on demand. The types of resource 
units include virtual machines created inside powerful computation servers used 
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mainly for computational work, virtual storage created in storage servers for data 
storage and retrieval, and virtual networks created among the servers and network 
equipment to facilitate private and secure communications among participating 
virtual servers. The principle feature of Cloud Computing data centers which 
separates it from a classical data center is its ability to scale up and down to match 
the number of requests on demand. This is accomplished by dynamically allocating 
or de-allocating the resource units according to the arrival and completion of user 
requests. 
Two key enabling technologies for Cloud Computing is the surge of availability of 
fast internet access by every day consumers, and the continuous hardware 
innovations which reduced the price for server hardware while increasing its 
computational capacity. Without fast internet access, sending and receiving the types 
of data to the Cloud, and within a Cloud would have been too slow to be useful to 
businesses and consumers. Without price reductions and compute capacity increases, 
Clouds could not service billions of users and requests every day. 
The central idea behind Cloud Computing began in the 1950s during the era of 
mainframe computer systems [4]. These systems had all of the computation 
equipment arranged in a single server room, while employees accessed them via a 
central terminal. To efficiently utilize the system, time sheets were used to allow 
employees to reserve time on the system. Employees would coordinate their access to 
the system through the time sheets, thus sharing the resources of the system. The 
notion of sharing computation resources began in this era. Technically, the 
mainframes of this era were standalone systems which operate in isolation. True 
time-sharing capable mainframes would arise later in the 1970s. 
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Professor John McCarthy, inventor of the LISP programming language, gave a special 
lecture in 1961 at Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he remarked that “If 
computers of the kind I have advocated become the computers of the future, then 
computing may someday be organized as a public utility just as the telephone system 
is a public utility…. The computer utility could become the basis of a new and 
important industry” [5]. In essence, Professor McCarthy defined the notion of utility 
computing in that lecture, forever setting a goal and direction to bring computing to 
the public in an affordable way. 
In the 1970s, IBM released an operating system called “Virtual Machine” for their 
System/370 mainframe systems [6]. This operating system allowed distinctive 
computation environments in every virtual machine, for every employee who 
connected to the system. The specific technique that IBM engineers and scientists 
developed was Dynamic Address Translation, used to translate a relative storage 
address per VM to a physical storage address on the storage mediums of the day. 
Virtualizing the storage was sufficient for the computer architectures and systems in 
those days to create independent computation environments in a mainframe. The 
idea behind Dynamic Address Translation of using a logical addresses in software, 
and translate it into physical addresses by hardware was of such value that today we 
can see its use in many modern computer systems. This marked the beginning of the 
era whereby computers could work on multiple tasks in parallel while maintaining 
independent computation environments for its users. The notion of “Virtual” in 
Virtual Machines was born. 
Amazon Inc. is arguably the company who invented modern Cloud Computing, in the 
early 2000s. Their efforts aimed to improve the internal resource utilization of their 
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massive data centers powering Amazon’s worldwide commerce web system. The 
results proved very successful, leading Amazon to rent out their extra computational 
capacities to the public in 2006. Whilst Amazon did not invent the notions of 
resource sharing, utility computing, or virtual machines, their work in defining the 
architecture of a modern Cloud lead to a concrete definition of the economic and 
pricing models for monetizing shared computation capacity. 
Modern Cloud storage began as an evolution of classical web storage services (such 
as FTP servers), network-attached storage technology, and the virtual storage systems 
by IBM in the 1960s. FTP servers provided a method to transfer files to and from a 
remote FTP server, while network-attached storage provided a method to transfer 
files to and from a storage device located within a local or enterprise network. FTP, 
more specifically its secure variant SFTP, gave Cloud storage its first communications 
protocol for securely transmitting a file over the internet. Network-attached storage 
protocols enabled Cloud storage providers to network together thousands of hard 
drives and manage them in one central server to provide the storage service. Modern 
virtual machine technology development provided the notion and idea to dynamically 
allocate storage resources. Combined together, the idea of a dynamically allocated 
secure storage service on the internet was born. 
The earliest modern Cloud storage was built by Amazon as part of the Amazon Web 
Service in 2006, which provided Cloud storage and computation services [7]. This 
service was available for everyone in the public to use. Since then, numerous 
competing services have been built. Some are built on top of Amazon, such as 
Dropbox, while others are built from the ground up, such as Microsoft OneDrive. 
Chapter 2: Background 
9 
2.2 SECURE AND RELIABLE STORAGE PRINCIPLES 
The previous section hints at specific security principles for storing data. This 
section describes these principles in concrete detail, and outlines why they are 
important to satisfy when designing a secure Cloud storage system. The overarching 
principle is to “not put all the eggs in one basket”. 
2.2.1 REPLICATION AND REDUNDANCY 
If there exists only a single true copy of some data, and this copy was somehow lost, 
then the data would be lost with it forever. Replication involves “carbon” copying the 
original data to create backup copies. In digital file systems, this is relatively easy as 
the bits constituting the data are simply duplicated. Replication safe guards the data 
from being lost or destroyed, so long as at any time there are always at least two 
copies of the data in existence. If any one of these copies were to be lost, tampered 
with, or destroyed, we can simply create another copy from the intact copy of the 
data. Redundancy is a measure of how much duplication exists for some data. 
Generally, some redundancy is needed to ensure the safety of the data in the event of 
data loss or corruption. Redundancy viewed as a necessary cost, and the objective of 
this principle is to provide the required amount of data security at the lowest 
possible cost, namely, to minimize redundancy. 
We define Resultant Size Factor as the resultant size of a file (after adding 
redundancy) divided by the original size of the file. If the original file was divided 
into K number of equal size pieces, and we add R number of redundancy pieces to 
the file whereby the size of each R piece is the same as the size of each K piece, then 
RSF is the total number of pieces of data (N) divided by the number of pieces of data 
constituting the original data (K). 
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Equation 1 – Resultant Size Factor 
                       






A file will always have at minimum a Resultant Size Factor value of 1.0, where R = 0, 
implying the file has no redundancy. As well, K is always at least 1. Logically, if the 
original data was not split, we would still have 1 piece of data. We also define 
Redundancy Factor as R divided by N: 
Equation 2 – Redundancy Factor 





   
 
Redundancy Factor represents a relative level of security for some data. RF has a 
minimum value of 0.0, with R = 0, representing no redundancy. The higher the value 
of RF, the more secure the data is against data loss and corruption. 
Redundancy Factor and Resultant Size Factor are interrelated. To minimize Resultant 
Size Factor, we have to minimize the Redundancy Factor. Both RSF and RF have no 
finite upper bound in its possible value, but the larger values, the more redundant 
the resultant data is. The goal of a Cloud storage system is to minimize Resultant 
Size Factor, getting it as close to the value of 1.0 as possible, with respect to a 
desired Redundancy Factor chosen as a design goal of the system. The thesis 
presents a number of techniques and algorithms towards this goal in Chapter 6. We 
set the redundancy factor to be equal among the algorithms to represent an equal 
level of security against data loss and corruption, and then compare their resultant 
size factor to determine how efficient the algorithms are at achieving this objective. 
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If we rewrite Equation 1 and Equation 2 with respect to N we have the following 
identities: 




        








Equating N on both sides, we can write RSF and RF as a function of each other: 




    
 
    
 
   
 
     
 
Further, we can rearrange the identity such that both factors are on one side of the 
equation, forming the redundancy minimization function: 
Equation 3 – Redundancy Minimization Function 




If we hold RF at a constant value, then to minimize RSF we would require the 
algorithms to give us a lower ratio between R and K, implying essentially that a more 
efficient algorithm will be able to achieve the same RF while adding less redundant 
data pieces. 
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2.2.2 CONFUSION AND DIFFUSION 
In cryptography and cryptosystems research, the principles of confusion and 
diffusion are central in evaluating the strength of cryptographic algorithms and 
systems in safeguarding data. In this research area, plaintext refers to the data we 
want to safeguard through an encryption system that uses an encryption key (such as 
a password) to translate the plaintext into ciphertext. Ciphertext is the encrypted 
version of the plaintext. For example, if the data we wish to encrypt is an English 
essay, the ciphertext would appear to be a random collection of incoherent letters 
and symbols. In cryptosystems, attackers ultimately have the objective of obtaining 
the plaintext. The easiest of the three pieces of data to obtain by an attacker is the 
ciphertext as an attacker could listen in to a secured communication channel such as 
a free Wi-Fi hotspot. However, bad computing habits such as reusing the same 
password across multiple accounts quite often allows attackers to have easy access 
to the encryption key as well. 
Originally defined by Claude Shannon in his paper “Communication Theory of 
Secrecy Systems” in 1949, Confusion refers to “making the relationship between the 
key and the ciphertext as complex and involved as possible” [8]. This is so that if an 
attacker obtains the ciphertext, they would need to spend significant effort to find 
out the relationship between the ciphertext and the key, and thus obtain the key. If 
the Confusion principle is not applied, then an attacker could easily obtain the key 
through the ciphertext, and then use the cryptosystem to obtain the plaintext. 
Shannon also defines Diffusion in his paper as the effect of “dissipating the 
statistical nature of the plaintext over all ciphertext” such that the two statistics 
cannot be correlated. In modern digital cryptosystems, this means to spread the 
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effects of each bit of plaintext and key to as many bits of the ciphertext as possible. 
Ideally, every bit of plaintext, and every bit of key is involved in creating a single bit 
of ciphertext. That way, if any bit changes in the plaintext or key, the ciphertext 
would change completely. This aims to disperse any statistical characteristics of the 
plaintext and key over the entirety of ciphertext, so that attacks based on statistical 
methods become useless. If the Diffusion principle is not applied, an attacker can 
potentially determine the plaintext through the ciphertext without needing to know 
the key, by directly inferring the plaintext using the statistical characteristics of 
known languages such as English. 
In practice, cryptographic algorithms utilize character substitution and character 
position permutation to achieve the principles of confusion and diffusion, 
respectively. Often multiple rounds of substitution and permutation is performed, 
such as in the DES algorithm, to ensure high cryptographic strength. 
Cloud storage algorithms and systems would ideally apply both of these principles in 
tandem to safeguard users’ data. The application of these principles could be 
accomplished by the use of encryption algorithms prior to the use of replication and 
redundancy algorithms, or as shown in Chapter 6, could be accomplished as part of 
the replication and redundancy algorithms. When an algorithm applies the Confusion 
principle, it has the Confusion Property. When an algorithm applies the Diffusion 
principle, it has the Diffusion Property. 
2.2.3 OFF-SITE DATA PROTECTION 
Utilizing off-site data protection allows users to safeguard their data in the event that 
the onsite copy becomes corrupt, lost, or destroyed by unexpected events such as 
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natural disaster or complete system crash. The aim of off-site data protection is to 
allow for quick recovery from such disasters, by being able to retrieve the critical 
data from the off-site and use it to restore the onsite systems. The principle works 
upon the notion that major disaster events are unlikely to occur in both the onsite 
and off-site locations at the same time, relatively speaking, compared to the 
likeliness of only one of the two locations experiencing the same event. 
A simple way to show this is a coin toss experiment, whereby we denote that if the 
coin tosses with Head side facing up, then a disaster occurs. Similarly, if it tosses 
with Tail side facing up, then a disaster does not occur. Coin 1 denotes the onsite, 
while coin 2 denotes the off-site. We can see that a coin tosses with probability of ½ 
for Head and ½ for Tail. Therefore, the individual probability of either one of the 
sites experiencing a disaster would be 50%. The two events are always independent of 
each other. The probability that both of the sites would experience disaster at the 
same time is equivalent to the probability that both coins would toss with Head side 
facing up at the same time, which is ½ × ½ = ¼. Generally, the joint probability is 
shown as follows: 
Equation 4 – Joint Probability of Two Statistically Independent Events 
                    
Events such as natural disasters and system crashes have their own probabilities, and 
are often less than 50%. Equation 4 shows that no matter what the individual 
probabilities are, the chance of two independent events occurring at the same time 
will always be less than the chance of them occurring individually. 
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Using off-site data protection, a user can spread and reduce risks due to disasters 
and unexpected events by taking advantage of this principle. Further, a user can 
utilize multiple off-sites to protect their data, further reducing the risks. Cloud 
storage systems would ideally take advantage of this principle by utilizing multiple 
off-sites to safeguard users’ data. 
2.2.4 PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE 
The principle of least privilege states to grant a user, task, process, or server only the 
information it needs to accomplish its legitimate tasks. A Cloud storage environment 
contains the data of many users at a time, often in shared hardware and computing 
environments. The principle needs to be enforced to safeguard users from being able 
to modify and access each other’s data when permissions have not been granted. 
Users should by default only be granted access to their data and no one else’s. If a 
user shares some data with another user, then that user should only be able to have 
access to the shared data and not the private data of other users. Users should be 
prevented from being able to obtain administrative access and privileges, and thus 
other users’ data. Likewise, the design of the Cloud storage system should be in such 
a way that the data is always protected from access until a user proves beyond a 
doubt they are who they claim they are. That is, the privilege of access is no data, by 
default. 
2.3 VALUE OF DATA 
A person’s data is intrinsically valuable. Human activities on the planet have 
generated enormous amounts of data which, relative to history, have only been 
recently studied en masses due to the recent surge of Big Data analytics and 
software. A single individual’s data can range from personally identifiable 
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information such as health records, private data files, publicly available birth records, 
to non-obvious data such as highway traffic information – an amalgamation of data 
of many individual’s driving habits. All of these data are valuable. Some of them are 
valuable to the individual, while others are valuable to their families and friends. 
Some of the data is highly valuable for certain businesses but not to other 
businesses, and some of them are highly valuable to the government. This section 
explores in detail how much value data has. 
2.3.1 VALUE OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE DATA 
Personal Information is considered by the vast majority of laws across the world as 
any information which can be used to uniquely identify an individual, whether living 
or deceased. 
Identity theft is one of the most worrisome problems related to the loss of personal 
information. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) defines identity theft as the 
“collection and possession of someone else’s personal information for criminal 
purposes” [9]. RCMP further defines identity fraud as the act of using someone else’s 
identity to commit acts of fraud. Identity thieves aim mostly to steal and obtain 
access to someone’s financial accounts and resources, such as bank accounts, credit 
card information, and passwords. Access to this information can deplete one’s 
financial resources instantly, as well as cause damages to one’s financial record such 
that the victim can no longer borrow funds from banks or obtain credit. Other main 
uses of such personal information include impersonation for the purpose of illegal 
entry, stay, and work, and tracking the person’s movements. 
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Research by L. Sweeney at Carnegie Mellon University [10] shows that for United 
States of American citizens, 87% of them are uniquely identifiable simply through 
three pieces of data of mailing ZIP code, gender, and date of birth. The three pieces 
of data can be obtained as easily as looking through publicly available medical data, 
and voter list. Sometimes, personally identifiable information can be obtained 
through just a single piece of document such as a passport. 
2.3.2 LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE DATA 
In Canada, the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act (S.C. 
2000) states the rules and conditions whereby personal information can be collected, 
stored, used, and disposed [11]. The act is often referred by its acronym PIPEDA. The 
act requires organizations to obtain informed consent by individuals prior to the 
collection of their personal information, and only for reasonable purposes that are 
clearly stated. It requires that the organization collect only the information in needs 
to fulfill the stated purposes, and no other personal information. It also requires 
organizations to safely store and protect the information with appropriate security 
measures against unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use, or modification. 
Businesses must also destroy the information safely when it is no longer needed or if 
the business purpose for use of the information changes. The act also grants the 
individuals the right to see all the information collected about them and to correct 
the information if they are wrong [12] [13]. Exceptions to these rules are also stated 
in the act, such as that an organization is not obligated to disclose information of 
one individual if such disclosure would inadvertently disclose information about 
other individuals. Organizations however are obligated to disclose information when 
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the non-disclosure would obstruct justice and the enforcement of law, or 
compromise the safety of the persons in emergency situations [12]. 
An interesting violation of PIPEDA occurred in 2007, where Google’s collection of 
street images in Canada for its Street View application captured many images of 
individuals with sufficient clarity to allow the individuals to be identified. Since 
PIPDEA considers such images to be personal information, the works were subjected 
to Canadian laws. A letter from Canada’s Privacy Commissioner to Google states that 
Google collected the imagery “without the consent and knowledge of the individuals 
who appear in the images” [14], and that even though the Street View application 
allowed individuals to request images to be removed, “by the time individuals 
become aware that images relating to them are contained in Street View, their privacy 
rights may already have been affected”. Google’s solution came in the form of a 
slightly different version of Street View which adheres to Canada’s privacy laws [15].  
Australia requires personal information to be protected from “misuse, loss, and 
unauthorized access, modification, and disclosure” and has their own legislative 
requirements which Australian companies must follow [16]. In the United States of 
America, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is a set of 
privacy laws regarding health records and health information of patients. Improper 
handling of a person’s health record can result in fines as steep as $1.5 million USD 
per year [17]. 
While there are many laws and regulations in place around the world, a Cloud storage 
service provider will need to collect some amount of personal information in order to 
provide their services to those individuals; this includes financial information if the 
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service charges fees. It is important that the design of a Cloud storage system 
respects these laws and provide proper security in safeguarding personal 
information. 
2.3.3 BUSINESS VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA 
Personal data can be immensely valuable to companies. Data trading companies 
alone thrive on a pure business model of buying and reselling a person’s consumer 
behavior data. Much of the earnings in this industry come from the billions of dollars 
companies are spending advertising their products. Prior to the social network 
revolution, users often gave away uniquely identifiable personal information when 
they registered for an account for a website or web service. Such websites include 
online shopping websites, email services, instant messaging services, and others. The 
general types of information in this era was more explicit; for example, “what’s your 
marital status?” might be a question asked during a user account sign up page. 
Otherwise, the type of data can be explicitly derived from a person’s trail of activities 
on a website; such as suggesting products through purchase history on Amazon.com. 
The sources of data and patterns of activities increased as a result of social 
networking. For example, if two people change their relationship status with each 
other on an online social networking site to “married”, such information is of great 
value to any company involved in making and selling baby products. Such data is 
often used by advertisement companies to present products and services to users at 
such times. Such information could be obtained today even without an explicit 
change to an account profile, for example by utilizing image classification algorithms 
to data mine photo albums for wedding dresses and suites and faces to infer that a 
marriage happened between two people. Facial recognition is already a highly 
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successful feature of many social networking sites, and it would be inevitable to see 
more of such algorithms, such as DeepFace used by Facebook [18]. 
From repositories like these, a company can mine the shopping and communications 
habits and data of all their users and derive immense knowledge of them. There is an 
entire data trading industry for personal data known as the data broker industry, 
with a worth in multibillion dollars [19]. This industry is a fast growing, but 
ultimately a subpart of an even greater marketing industry. 
Certain companies make profit off of the data they collect directly by utilizing that 
data to deliver targeted advertisements to its users. Examples include Facebook, 
Google, Netflix, Amazon, Microsoft, and others. Economists tend to analyze these 
companies in bulk by taking the total revenue divided by total number of users as a 
simplified means of calculating the worth of each user’s data. For example, in 
Facebook’s 2013 year-end earnings report [20] [21], they’ve cited 757 million daily 
active users and revenue of $2.585 billion USD for fourth quarter 2013. Dividing the 
two numbers shows an average of $3.41 revenue per daily active user for that 
quarter. For the entire year, the revenue is $7.872 billion with an average daily user 
of around 712.25 million, making the revenue per user per year at $11.05 USD. 
From a broader perspective, consumer behavioral and personal data fall under the 
global internet commerce economic model, where a plausible measure for the entire 
economy can be the total dollars spent on marketing products and services to 
consumers. After all, companies do want to influence and capture an individual as a 
customer. There are also other markets, such as health care, whereby a person’s data 
would likely be traded for money since such data would be highly useful in health 
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care research and health care products market research. It is sufficient to conclude 
that a person’s data can be worth a lot. 
2.3.4 COSTS FROM LOSS OF DATA 
Whenever a company loses personal information and data, a multitude of 
consequences usually follows. Generally it can result in legal fines, financial loss, loss 
of intellectual property, loss of customers, and most critically loss of trust. Without a 
trustworthy reputation, a company will have a hard time conducting business. 
One of the most exemplary cases of loss of customer information was by Sony 
Corporation on April 16th and 17th, 2011 [22]. Sony Online Entertainment (SOE)’s 
press release states that up to 24.6 million customer account information might have 
been stolen by criminals, including names, addresses, email, birth date, gender, 
phone number, login names and hashed passwords. Within these, 12,700 credit or 
debit card numbers and expiration dates were stolen, as well as 10,700 debit records. 
A letter from Sony’s Chairman to the US House of Representatives, states that the 
PlayStation Network (PSN)’s 77 million registered accounts were also affected [23]. 
Sony took down all of their online gaming services to fix the security issues. They 
granted every customer 30 days of free subscription time for their online gaming 
network services, as well as a free day for each day their system was offline. Given 
that the price for a month of Sony Online Entertainment subscription time was 
$14.99 USD back in 2011 [24], and the 23 day closure of the PSN and SOE networks 
[25], this is equivalent to giving away $651.47 million USD of free online gaming 
services. Author was unable to find the cost of PSN monthly subscription costs, but 
can online imagine the free service cost figure to rise even higher. News reports also 
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indicated that Sony expended $171 million USD to conduct forensics investigations, 
repair the services, and perform other duties related to this breach [25]. 
Another exemplary case occurred in June of 2012 where, allegedly, an employee 
working for the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services Department (DHSS) 
lost a portable electronic storage device containing electronic health records. This 
case was investigated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
resulting in a fine of $1.7 million USD for Alaska’s DHSS [26]. 
2.4 FINITE FIELDS 
A light background in Finite Field mathematics is required for understanding Section 
6.3.7 of this thesis. This section presents an introduction to Finite Field mathematics. 
Finite Fields are also called Galois Fields, named after its inventor Évariste Galois 
whom published it in 1846 as “Œuvres Mathématiques” (English: “Mathematical 
Works”) in the Journal de Liouville [27], and subsequently republished by         
M     matique de France (English: Mathematical Society of France) in 1897 [28]. 
As defined by Menezes et al in their Handbook of Applied Cryptography [29], a Ring 
(R, +, ×) consists of a set R with two binary operations + (addition) and × 
(multiplication) on R, where it satisfies the four conditions: 
1) (R, +) is an abelian group with identity denoted 0, that is it is closed, 
associative and commutative for the + operation. 
2) The operation × is associative, that is a × (b × c) = (a × b) × c for all a, b, c ∈ R. 
3) There is a multiplicative identity denoted 1, with 1 ≠ 0, such that 1 × a = a × 1 
= a for all a ∈ R. 
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4) The operation × is distributive over +. That is a × (b + c) = (a × b) + (a × c) and 
(b + c) × a = (b × a) + (c × a) for all a, b, c ∈ R. 
A Ring is a commutative ring if a × b = b × a for all a, b ∈ R. Each element a of a ring 
R is called a unit, or an invertible element if there is an element b ∈ R such that a × b 
= 1. In this case, b is the multiplicative inverse of a.  
A Field is a commutative Ring in which all non-zero elements have multiplicative 
inverses. A Finite Field is a field F which contains a finite number of elements. The 
order of F is the number of elements C in F. The number of elements must be a 
prime power, that is C = PM, where P is a prime number. If M = 1, the fields are called 
Prime Fields. If M ≥ 2, the fields are called Extension Fields. A Finite Field is denoted 
by the notation GF(C), shorthand for GaloisField(C). For example, Figure 1 shows a 
Finite Field of 24 = 16 elements. 
 
Figure 1 – Galois Field of 16 Elements 
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The elements of the Finite Field are based upon a primitive element α, taking on the 
values 0, α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, … αC-1. α0 always equals 1. This set also forms a notation 
known as the Field’s Index Representation. For a given Finite Field, αN is the index of 
the element, while the element would contain some particular value depending on 
what α is. 
2.4.1 FINITE FIELD GENERATOR POLYNOMIAL AND REPRESENTATION 
A Finite Field has a particular property called the Field Generator Polynomial, 
denoted as G(X). It is a polynomial of degree M which is irreducible. A polynomial is 
irreducible if there are no factors with coefficients over the integers Z. The only 
polynomial and element that is irreducible in GF(2) is 1, thus the field generator 
polynomial for GF(2) is G(X) = 1. For GF(16), two polynomials are irreducible: X4 + X + 
1 and X4 + X3 + 1. The rest of the examples in the thesis use G(X) = X4 + X + 1 as the 
generator polynomial for GF(16). 
Besides the Index Representation shown earlier, each element of the Finite Field is 











. Mathematically this polynomial is related to the primitive element α by the field 
generator polynomial. The Generator Polynomial generates the values of each 
element. Further, a defined property is that G(α) = 0 as the primitive element is a root 
of the generator polynomial. 
2.4.2 BINARY FIELDS AND POLYNOMIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
In digital systems, Binary Fields are used. Binary Fields are GF(2M) fields, where M 
represents the number of bits of any element in the field. The most elementary 
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Binary Field, GF(2), has only 1 bit and two elements of 0 and 1. In binary fields, the 
primitive element α is 2. 
In GF(2), addition is the logical XOR of the two bits and multiplication is the logical 
AND of the two bits. There’s no bit carry or borrows in this field, as such subtraction 
and division are the same as addition and multiplication, respectively. A 
Computation table is provided for GF(2) below in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Finite Field Arithmetic for GF(2) Binary Field 











. For example, the element 5 can be represented as {0101} in binary form in 











, where the coefficients A
i
 are the binary 









. The element 5 would be represented as X2 + 1. 
Using G(X) from 2.4.1, we can substitute in the primitive element α to obtain the 
following equivalencies: 
              
    
       
Note: Additions and subtractions are the same in a binary field; this is shown in 
Section 2.4.3. 
+ 0 1  × 0 1  – 0 1  ÷ 0 1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
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To enumerate the polynomial representations for each of the elements of a Finite 
Field, one uses the generator polynomial to compute αN for N = 0 to C-1, reducing the 
polynomial via substitution. Eg:        from above, and                  
    . Using G(X) above, the representations for GF(16) is shown below in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Field Elements for GF(16) with G(X) = X4 + X + 1 
Since α is 2 in Binary Fields, we can substitute that into the polynomial to get the 
equivalent decimal value of each element. We can also extract the coefficients from 
the polynomials to obtain their binary values, which match their decimal values. 
2.4.3 BINARY FIELD ARITHMETIC 
































, for 0 ≤ i ≤ M-1. 
GF Index Reduced Polynomial Form Decimal Value Binary Value 
    0 0000 
     1 0001 
     2 0010 
      4 0100 
      8 1000 
       3 0011 
        6 0110 
         12 1100 
          11 1011 
        5 0101 
        10 1010 
           7 0111 
            14 1110 
              15 1111 
            13 1101 
         9 1001 
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Since the coefficients are binary numbers, they can only take on the values of 0 or 1, 






, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 
M-1. 
For example, adding decimal values 10 and 9 (index values α9 and α14) in GF(16) using 
binary operations would be calculated as follows:  
                                
An alternative way to add the two values is to directly add their index positions 
modulus G(X). G(X) in decimal value would be 16 + 2 + 1 = 19. Since α9 = 10 and α14 = 
9, their index positions are 9 and 14 respectively. 
9 + 14 mod 19 = 23 mod 19 = 4, and α4 = 3 
Subtracting 9 from 10 would be calculated as: 10 – 9 = {1010} XOR {1001} = {0011} = 
3. Thus subtraction and addition are the same in binary fields. 
Multiplication in a Binary Field involves multiplying their polynomials modulus G(X). 
For example multiplying 10 to 9 in GF(16) would be calculated as follows: 
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Similarly, Division in a Binary Field involves computing the quotient of the two 
polynomials. Often this is done by long division procedure. 
                      
Table 3 summarizes the arithmetic operations in a Binary Field. 
Table 3 – Binary Field Arithmetic 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced Cloud Computing and Cloud Storage as a highly scalable, 
utility computing paradigm with a rich history since the 1950s. Cloud Computing 
groups together vast pools of computation resources and dynamically allocates them 
to live user requests or workloads.  
We also presented the key secure and reliable storage principles which 
cryptographers and system designers use to design modern secure systems. 
Replication and Redundancy helps safeguard data by making them resilient to losses. 
Confusion and Diffusion principles define the necessary properties a system must 
have to be considered cryptographically secure. Off-site data protection helps users 
protect their data against local equipment failures. Finally the Principle of Lease 
Privilege guides us towards designing secure access rules to ensure that users of a 
system cannot effect actions which they are not authorized to do so. 
Operation Calculation in Classical Algebra Calculation in GF(2
M
) 
Addition R = A + B R = A XOR B in Polynomial Form 
Subtraction R = A – B R = A XOR B in Polynomial Form 
Multiplication R = A × B R = (A × B) Mod G(X) in Polynomial Form 
Division R = A ÷ B R = Quotient of A ÷ B 
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We explored the value of personal data from four perspectives. We showed the 
potential damage misplaced data could cause to users. We showed the legal 
requirements on personal information around the world, and the consequences when 
the law isn’t followed by companies. We showed the revenue companies can make 
when they have legal access to personal information, and the costs companies pay 
when they failed to safeguard personal information. 
Finally we introduced Finite Field mathematics. 





CHAPTER 3: CLOUD STORAGE RISKS, 
BENEFITS, AND COSTS 
The use of Cloud storage comes with unique risks, benefits, and costs through a new 
economic model. This chapter presents all three of these in depth to give readers a 
detailed understanding of the trade-off between the risks and benefits, and the costs 
to use Cloud storage. For the purposes of discussion, we consider data to be 
encapsulated in digital electronic documents, or simply files. Files can contain 
structured and organized information such as spreadsheets, or unstructured 
information such as books and videos. 
We begin this chapter by presenting an in depth analysis of the risks of using Cloud 
storage in Section 3.1. Then we show the analysis of the benefits users can reap in 
Section 3.2. We show the costs associated with using Cloud storage along with a 
comparison to using local storage in Section 3.3, and finish the chapter with a 
summary. 
3.1 CLOUD STORAGE RISKS 
A user’s data is highly valuable to both the user and to the organizations and 
businesses providing the storage service. This section examines the types of risks a 
user faces by storing files on the Cloud. 
3.1.1 MALICIOUS ATTACKS FROM ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD 
The ability to authenticate and access the data from anywhere around the world 
presents a unique problem and risk. Attackers no longer need to physically track 
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down the specific device or hard drive containing the data desired; instead they may 
concentrate their efforts at breaking the authentication mechanism to obtain vast 
troves of data from many users. The vast majority of Cloud storage system security 
breaches are related to authentication mechanism weaknesses or attacks, for 
example the 2011 attack on Dropbox [1] which allowed anyone on the internet to 
download any files stored and hosted by Dropbox for a 4 hour time period. Another 
example comes from a paid research by Amazon. In 2011, Amazon invited a team of 
security experts and researchers to conduct attacks on their servers. The researchers 
were able to access data stored in Amazon’s S3 service [2]. In the 2009 attack against 
Twitter, the anonymous attacker exploited weaknesses in password recovery 
mechanism of Google’s email service, and was eventually able to obtain many 
confidential corporate documents and information from email attachments of the 
corporate email accounts of Twitter employees, which was a hosted email service on 
a Cloud run by Google [30]. Breaches in the authentication mechanism of Cloud 
storage providers prove to be deadly in terms of allowing a user’s private data be 
accessible and exposed to the entire world, and allowing it to be modified or deleted 
by attackers. An ideal solution would allow data to be safe even when authentication 
mechanisms have been compromised. 
3.1.2 IMPLICIT DEPENDENCE ON STORAGE PROVIDER RELIABILITY 
Storage providers can sometimes halt their services in order to perform periodic 
maintenance work to their systems, which presents a risk to users if users need 
access to their data during times of unavailability. Although it is not a security risk, 
this is concerning when users send files onto the Cloud and remove all local copies to 
maximize their storage space. There is also a general trend of moving computation, 
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software, and data storage completely to the Cloud, where local machines serve only 
as consoles to remotely access the software and data on the Cloud [31]. Access 
outages may also be caused by internet service providers, or by natural disasters. All 
of these potential sources of outages are not in a user’s control, and in fact always 
has a probabilistic chance of occurring. No matter the source or reason, outages will 
cause inconvenience for users. An ideal solution would be able to work around 
outages. 
3.1.3 RISK OF DATA LOSS AND DATA CORRUPTION 
Major storage providers have software mechanisms in place to mitigate equipment 
failure [32], however there is always the chance that a user’s data is completely lost. 
For example, natural disasters may flood or short circuit an entire data center, 
corrupting all of the data. Mistakes made by employees may misplace sets of hard 
drives during upgrade or maintenance, losing the data. Software mistakes may cause 
user’s data to be written over. In fact, Clouds are utilizing cheap commodity hard 
disks as a means to minimize costs, which have higher risks and chances of failure 
compared to server grade hard drive equipment. Whenever complete data loss occurs 
on a Cloud, a user only has the option to re-upload the data to another more reliable 
Cloud, assuming the user has a local copy. An ideal solution would distribute a file 
among several Cloud service providers, so that the user can enjoy the benefits of 
Cloud storage and be able to tolerate complete data loss by individual Cloud service 
providers. 
3.1.4 IMPLICIT REQUIREMENT TO ALWAYS TRUST THE PROVIDER 
The use of Cloud storage services requires users to implicitly trust the service 
provider. Users must trust the service provider’s ability and capability to defend 
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against attackers and intruders, to safeguard the data against equipment failure, to 
not compromise and modify their data, and to respect the privacy and confidentiality 
of the user as well. While there are terms of use agreements, and privacy policies in 
place, the vast majority of Cloud storage providers ultimately disclaim any liability 
and responsibility for the data stored on their Clouds. It is a compromising position 
when the absolute control of a user’s Cloud data rests in the hands of the service 
provider, but the absolute responsibility for the data rests on the user. The 
requirement of such implicit trust is often disregarded by users in lieu of the gains of 
the benefits of Cloud storage. In an ideal case, this requirement should be removed 
while still retaining the benefits of Cloud storage. 
3.1.5 CONFLICTING LAWS MAY NOT RESPECT USERS’ PRIVACY 
It is known that data stored on the Cloud has become a hot target for law 
enforcement and security agencies as they issue access for information requests and 
warrants to obtain data, often in bulk. Such warrants apply equally to local 
computers and storage devices, of course. Law abiding citizens would comply with 
the warrants when requested. The complexity starts rising when consideration is 
given to the fact that, quite often, Cloud services hosted by one country can and is 
used by users from all over the world. A bulk data request may inadvertently allow 
one nation’s law enforcement obtain the data stored by a citizen of another nation, 
simply due to the physical location of the data center and Cloud. Many nations have 
laws in place regarding the placement and location of data in terms of their physical 
storage devices. For example, in British Columbia, Bill 73 – the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 2004 states “A public body 
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must ensure that personal information in its custody or under its control is stored 
only in Canada and accessed only in Canada” [33].  
Most nations also have laws regarding any data physically stored within their 
geography. By default, a user has to assume that the data they place in a specific 
Cloud will be subject to all the local laws, regulations, culture, customs, and security 
standards of the nation in which the data is physically stored. The complex layers of 
national and international laws require solutions through political dialogue and 
international treaties, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, of 
importance to a user is an ability to know where their data is located geographically 
around the world. Better yet, users should be able to control where their data is 
located, so that they can avoid placement of their data in nations that they feel might 
be risky or not trustworthy. 
3.2 CLOUD STORAGE BENEFITS 
There are numerous benefits to storing files on the Cloud, including economic cost 
reductions, flexibility, world wide access, and improving resource utilization. This 
section analyzes all the benefits of using Cloud storage in detail.  
3.2.1 A NEW ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT MODEL 
Cloud storage and Cloud Computing both offer an economic model for consumers to 
pay only for what they use, like a utility bill. The infrastructure and operation costs 
are paid by the service provider, for example the costs for purchasing thousands of 
hard drives, equipment set up and maintenance, management, and electricity costs. 
In turn, these costs are shared among all users of the system, being usually charged a 
fixed rate for each unit of resource usage or consumption. Storage providers typically 
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offer various storage quotas, which can be increased or decreased on demand by 
users. 
Since all installation and management work is performed by the storage provider, 
start-up companies and small to medium size businesses can take advantage of this 
to reduce upfront costs. For short term projects, they also don’t have to worry about 
reselling any hardware. The economic flexibility and savings can allow companies to 
hire more staff to accelerate their ideas and projects to meet goals and milestones 
faster. 
3.2.2 IMPROVED RESOURCE UTILIZATION 
From a resource utilization perspective, pooling together resources and users is a 
highly efficient means to consume the resources. Studies by the University of 
Pennsylvania have shown that computer machines consume on average 50% to 90% of 
electricity when they are idle compared to when they are fully loaded with 
computation tasks [34]. The idle power consumption rate depends largely on the 
computer manufacturer and whether the LCD was kept on while the computer idles. 
Naturally it makes sense to improve the utilization of servers by constantly assigning 
tasks to them to keep them active. Similarly, any unused portion of a hard drive may 
generally be seen as a waste of the resource. If a project requires 500GB of storage, 
then purchasing 1TB of storage space is unnecessary and wasteful, increasing the 
effective price per GB of storage. Prior to Cloud storage, users often purchase some 
additional space in their computers for use by temporary files, and to anticipate for 
any of their growing data storage needs. Cloud storage allows users to request for 
additional storage on demand, increasing the size of their allowance when they need 
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it. Similarly it allows users to reduce their allowance when they no longer need the 
extra space. 
3.2.3 WORLDWIDE ACCESS 
Users today carry portable computing devices with them on a daily basis, and access 
their data from many different machines. Cloud storage allows a user to authenticate 
to the service and access their data from any device which can operate the service’s 
software. Users can also access their data from anywhere in the world as long as they 
have a connection to the service. The ease of access from across the world is a 
strength of the Cloud storage service, compared to more traditional means such as 
carrying around portable storage devices like a USB drive. 
3.2.4 FILE VERSIONING AND RECOVERY 
Cloud storage services can also retain versions of a user’s files and data through 
time, allowing the user to revert unintended changes, or mistakes such as 
accidentally deleting an important file. On traditional hard drives in a local computer, 
a user would have to remember what changes occurred and try to manually revert 
them if it is possible. For any deleted files, users would have to utilize disk recovery 
software to attempt to recover the data from the file. The former is error prone and 
relies upon human memory, while the latter has no guarantee of success because 
once a file is deleted the system treats the space taken up by that file as free space 
and might write over the data with data from new files. Cloud storage systems 
automatically create and retain versions of files and data as a safe guard. Whenever a 
user wants to revert some change, they can make a request to their Cloud storage 
service provider to have the change reverted. This process is streamlined, simple, and 
efficient. 
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3.2.5 FILE SHARING AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
Sharing files and data between authorized users is also easier through a Cloud 
storage system. Cloud storage systems have sophisticated authentication 
mechanisms which can grant read-only or read-and-write access to fellow users in the 
system if the original owner of a file allows it. The owner can grant these settings 
through the user interface of the Cloud storage system. Fellow users can then log 
onto the system and download a copy of the file whenever and from wherever they 
wish. If given write access, the files shared through a Cloud storage system can 
become a working repository where every change is always synchronized between all 
users. This form of file and data sharing is much more efficient in terms of storage 
space compared to emails, where the file would have to be replicated as many times 
as there are users, and where changes and updates must also be replicated in such a 
matter to have everyone on track. 
3.2.6 A WAY TO BACKUP DATA 
Cloud storage allows users to easily apply the principle of keeping off-site backups of 
their data. By keeping a backup copy on the Cloud, any local catastrophes such as a 
complete equipment failure of the local hard drive will not affect or compromise the 
data stored on the Cloud. Users can often quickly recover their data, and get back up 
to speed with their work and tasks when such events occur with the assistance of 
Cloud storage. 
3.3 CLOUD STORAGE COSTS 
There are a series of costs associated with using Cloud storage. Generally speaking 
there are two segments of costs which are shown in on Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – Cloud Storage Cost Model 
The two segments are the internet connection costs paid by the user to their internet 
service provider to connect to and use the internet, and Cloud storage provider costs 
paid by the user to specifically use the Cloud storage service. Internet connection 
costs include all of the data uploaded to, or downloaded from the internet. Cloud 
storage provider costs include potentially inbound traffic fees, outbound traffic fees, 
and storage fees. This section begins with a survey of internet connection and Cloud 
storage provider costs from the most popular providers in Canada and USA. Then, we 
present a survey of local disk storage prices to establish a cost reference point, to 
frame the discussions off the value and economic effects of pricing in Cloud storage. 
3.3.1 INTERNET CONNECTION COSTS 
In North America, most home internet service providers offer different plans where 
the main characteristic difference is the download and upload speeds. Generally, the 
download speeds offered are much higher than the upload speeds. In Canada during 
the year of 2014, home and business internet plans also have data usage allowance 
limits, where as in USA there isn’t. The plans and data rates offered by some of the 
most popular service providers in Canada and USA as of February 2014 are shown in 
Table 4. 
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Table 4 – Internet Service Provider Pricing [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] 
If a company puts a cap on usage allowance it is easy to calculate the precise cost for 






























$225.99 350 350 2000 No N/A $0.11 $0.65 $0.65 
$125.99 250 20 1000 Yes $1/GB $0.13 $0.50 $6.30 
$77.99 45 4 150 Yes $2/GB $0.52 $1.73 $19.50 
$67.99 35 3 120 Yes $2/GB $0.57 $1.94 $22.66 
$54.99 25 2 80 Yes $2/GB $0.69 $2.20 $27.50 





$152.95 175 175 300 No $2/GB $0.51 $0.87 $0.87 
$85.95 50 10 175 No $2/GB $0.49 $1.72 $8.60 
$60.95 25 10 100 No $2/GB $0.61 $2.44 $6.10 
$52.95 15 10 60 No $2/GB $0.88 $3.53 $5.30 




$86.95 150 10 300 Yes $0.50/GB $0.29 $0.58 $8.70 
$54.99 50 10 300 Yes $0.25/GB $0.18 $1.10 $5.50 
$56.95 45 4 300 Yes $0.50/GB $0.19 $1.27 $14.24 
$51.95 35 3 300 Yes $0.50/GB $0.17 $1.48 $17.32 
$39.99 25 10 300 Yes $0.25/GB $0.13 $1.60 $4.00 
$34.99 15 10 300 Yes $0.25/GB $0.12 $2.33 $3.50 




$120.00 250 15 1000 No N/A $0.12 $0.48 $8.00 
$90.00 100 5 500 No N/A $0.18 $0.90 $18.00 
$80.00 50 3 400 No N/A $0.20 $1.60 $26.67 
$60.00 25 2.5 250 No N/A $0.24 $2.40 $24.00 




$71.00 24 3 250 Yes $0.2/GB $0.28 $2.96 $23.67 
$61.00 18 1.5 250 Yes $0.2/GB $0.24 $3.39 $40.67 
$56.00 12 1.5 250 Yes $0.2/GB $0.22 $4.67 $37.33 
$51.00 6 1 250 Yes $0.2/GB $0.20 $8.50 $51.00 




$299.99 500 100 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $0.60 $3.00 
$209.99 300 65 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $0.70 $3.23 
$129.99 150 65 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $0.87 $2.00 
$89.99 75 35 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $1.20 $2.57 
$79.99 50 25 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $1.60 $3.20 




$114.95 105 30 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $1.09 $3.83 
$76.95 50 15 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $1.54 $5.13 
$64.95 25 8 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $2.60 $8.12 
$49.95 6 1.5 Unlimited Yes N/A N/A $8.33 $33.30 
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Table 4, showing price ranging from $0.10/GB to $2.22/GB. In addition, the usage 
based billing prices for data used beyond the allowance is anywhere from $0.20/GB 
to $4.00/GB. Generally a more expensive plan includes a higher usage allowance, at a 
cheaper price per GB of data transferred. Companies tabulate both download and 
upload activities to calculate how much data has been used within the allowance. A 
user would regard this as a fixed cost per GB of data sent to or retrieved from the 
Cloud. 
In USA where most companies do not place a limit on usage, it is much easier to 
compare the time cost of transferring data to and from the Cloud. The higher the 
transfer speed, the less time it takes to transfer the data. This is beneficial for users 
since they can then spend the time on other activities, or free the bandwidth for 
other internet uses. The price for each unit of transfer speed could be used to 
compare the different plans. The computed values of cost per unit of transfer speed 
($/Mbps) are shown as well in Table 4. Generally, a more expensive plan provides 
faster download and upload speeds and a cheaper unit price for every incremental 
unit of speed. 
It would seem that no matter which of the two units of measure – price per data 
transferred or price per unit of transfer speed – the expensive plans are favored for 
their increased limits and lower unit costs. In practice however, each user would 
often choose an internet service plan based upon their available house hold budget 
and usage requirements. The use of Cloud storage services certainly increases the 
need for higher usage allowance. 
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Generally, these costs and parameters are not choices which the Cloud storage 
software and system can make, but has to work with to accomplish its goals. A Cloud 
storage system would be most optimal at minimizing the amount of data transfer 
necessary to accomplish each task. By minimizing the amount of data transferred, 
the system can minimize the data costs if usage allowance limits are present, and 
also accomplish transfers faster, minimizing the total time necessary to accomplish 
each task. No matter what a user chooses as their internet service plan, the costs can 
be minimized. 
3.3.2 CLOUD STORAGE PROVIDER COSTS 
Cloud storage service providers often operate on a “freemium”-style business model, 
where an initial amount of storage is free for each user, and subsequent amounts of 
storage service is given in exchange for monetary gains. The most popular Cloud 
storage providers in North America are Dropbox [42], Amazon S3 [43], Microsoft 
SkyDrive [44], Apple iCloud [45], and Google Drive [46] in no particular order. We 
consider only the paid storage services for comparison since it is desirable to 
attribute a finite cost figure. It is worth noting that each of these five storage 
providers have free services too subject to space quotas or other limitations, shown 
in Table 5. 
Table 5 – Free Tier Data Storage Limits for Cloud Providers [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the storage costs for February 2014 and February 2013, 
respectively, as listed by each of the provider’s websites for various tiers of storage. 
Between February 2013 and February 2014, Microsoft has rebranded its SkyDrive 
  Dropbox Amazon S3 Microsoft OneDrive Apple Google Drive 
Free Storage Amount (GB) 2 5 7 5 15 
Chapter 3: Cloud Storage Risks, Benefits, and Costs 
42 
service to OneDrive. The pricing has also changed for these two services, overall 
increasing its prices in 2014. The 25GB data tier has also been eliminated. Overall 
costs range from Google Drive’s $0.050/GB/month on the low end to Apple iCloud’s 
$0.167/GB/month on the high end. 
Table 6 – Cloud Storage Costs, February 2014 [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] 
Table 7 – Cloud Storage Costs, February 2013 [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] 
Of the five Cloud service providers, only Amazon S3 charges a transmission cost for 
data. It charges a transmission fee for downloading data off of its servers. It does not 

































50   4.25 5.49 8.33   
 
0.085 0.110 0.167 
 
100 9.99 8.50 8.49   4.99 0.100 0.085 0.085 
 
0.050 
200 19.99 17.00 12.49   9.99 0.100 0.085 0.062 
 
0.050 





500 49.99 42.50       0.100 0.085 
   





2000   160.00     99.99 
 
0.080 
   
4000   310.00     199.99 
 
0.078 
   
8000   610.00     399.99 
 
0.076 
   
16000   1210.00     799.99 
 
0.076 
   
50000   3760.00       
 
0.075 
   
500000   30760.00       
 
0.062 
   





















10   0.82   1.67     0.082 
 
0.167   
20   1.62 0.83 3.33     0.081 0.042 0.167   
25   2.02     2.49   0.081     0.100 
50   4.02 2.08 8.33     0.080 0.042 0.167   
100 9.99 7.52 4.17   4.99 0.100 0.075 0.042   0.050 
200 19.99 14.52     9.99 0.100 0.073     0.050 
400   28.52     19.99   0.071     0.050 
500 49.99 35.52       0.100 0.071       
1000   68.02     49.99   0.068     0.050 
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charge transmission fee for uploading any data to its servers. The prices for 
transmitting different amounts of data are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 – Transmission Costs for Amazon S3, February 2014 [43] 
Overall, Amazon S3 charges on average $0.118/GB outgoing for any amount of data 
up to 10TB, reducing the rate in subsequent service tiers to as low as $0.059/GB. 
Any consumer side Cloud storage software systems should take into effect both the 
difference in prices and features of these providers, as well as the dynamic nature of 
the market place. 
3.3.3 COMPARISON WITH LOCAL DISK STORAGE COSTS 
Section 3.3.2 showed that Cloud storage providers charge between $0.050/GB/month 
to $0.167/GB/month for storing a user’s files on their Clouds. It is useful to know the 
range of unit costs for local disk storage as well, to see relatively how much more 
users would have to pay to take advantage of the benefits of Cloud storage. Table 9 
shows a sample of hard drive prices indexed in January, 2014 by a well-known 
product feature comparison and price ranking website called PCPartPicker [47]. 
2014 Price ($USD) Effective Price per GB ($USD) 
Transmission (GB) Amazon S3 Outbound S3 Outbound 
10 1.08 0.108 
20 2.28 0.114 
50 5.88 0.118 
100 11.88 0.119 
150 17.88 0.119 
200 23.88 0.119 
400 47.88 0.120 
500 59.88 0.120 
1000 119.88 0.120 
10000 1199.88 0.120 
50000 4799.88 0.096 
150000 11799.88 0.079 
500000 29299.88 0.059 
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Table 9 – Local Disk Storage Costs, January 2014 [47] 
For standard magnetic disk hard disk drives (HDD), the unit price ranges from as low 
as $0.0367/GB to as high as $0.8340/GB. On the low end of the price range, storing 
data on the Cloud seems to be much more expensive. For the first month, storing 
data on the Cloud would cost $0.050/GB, while buying a hard drive can cost 
$0.0367/GB. After the first month, the Cloud storage costs continue to add but the 
hard drive would have been paid for already. On the high end of the price ranges, 
buying a hard disk would cost $0.8340/GB while the first month Cloud storage cost 
would be $0.167/GB. Users can reap roughly 5 months of Cloud storage benefits 
before the costs would break even. However, it is naive to assume users would 
purchase hard disks at the high end of the price range. Likewise, Cloud storage 
providers aim to maximize profits so it is unlikely they would purchase hard drives 
on the high end of the price range. 
For specialty disk drives such as Solid State Drives (SSD) and Hybrid Disk Drives, 
Table 9 shows their lowest and highest unit costs. They range from $0.3495/GB to 
Model Type Form RPM Capacity (TB) Cache (MB) Price ($) Price / GB ($) 
Western Digital WD2500AAKX 
HDD 
3.5" 7200 250 16 57 0.2280 
Seagate ST9250610NS 3.5" 7200 250 64 126 0.5040 
Seagate ST500DM002 3.5" 7200 500 16 52.99 0.1060 
Seagate ST9500622NS 3.5" 7200 500 64 416.99 0.8340 
Seagate ST1000DM003 3.5" 7200 1000 64 59.99 0.0600 
Seagate ST91000640SS 3.5" 7200 1000 64 258.38 0.2584 
Seagate ST2000DM001 3.5" 7200 2000 64 89.79 0.0449 
Seagate ST32000644NS 3.5" 7200 2000 64 279.98 0.1400 
Seagate ST3000DM001 3.5" 7200 3000 64 109.99 0.0367 
Seagate ST33000651NS 3.5" 7200 3000 64 475.86 0.1586 
Seagate ST4000VN000 3.5" 7200 4000 64 189.95 0.0475 
Hitachi 0B26885 3.5" 7200 4000 64 666.68 0.1667 
Hitachi 0F18335 3.5" 7200 6000 64 969.47 0.1616 
PNY SSD9SC480GMDA-RB SSD 
 
2.5" N/A 480 N/A 167.75 0.3495 
OCZ OCT1-25SAT3-1T 2.5" N/A 1000 N/A 2071.56 2.0716 
Seagate ST4000DX001 
Hybrid 
3.5" N/A 4000 64 200.98 0.0502 
Seagate STBD1000400 3.5" N/A 1000 64 129.75 0.1298 
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$2.0716/GB for SSD drives, and $0.0502/GB to $0.1298/GB for Hybrid drives. Users 
gain significant disk throughput and performance with these specialty drives, but 
their unit costs are much higher than HDDs. Specialty disk drives would be used in 
high performance computation Clouds, however a Cloud storage service provider 
would be unlikely to invest in using specialty disk drives to store users’ files since 
they want to maximize revenue and profits. Start-up companies and small to medium 
size businesses will likely pay to store files on the Cloud because they can save 
management and operation costs as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.   
Overall, we can conclude that users can achieve lower short term and long term 
storage costs by simply purchasing hard drives from a computer store and placing 
their data into those hard drives. To enjoy the benefits of Cloud storage, users must 
pay a non-trivial fee once their use exceeds the free storage quotas. Thus, it is 
important for any Cloud storage system to minimize the short term and long term 
storage costs. 
3.3.4 ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
The data in Section 3.3.2 shows an interesting economic model for Amazon’s S3 
service, whereby it is free to upload data to Amazon; however it is not free to 
download the same data from Amazon. This business model favors a different type 
of application such as data-mining where users upload a lot of data to the Cloud, 
then perform extensive computation on the data obtain specific results that has a 
substantially smaller file size than the data, and then download only the results. 
To generalize these business models and practices, it is best to consider that a Cloud 
storage provider can charge for both incoming and outgoing data, often charges a fee 
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for data stored on their Clouds, can impose transfer and storage limits, and can 
change the prices and rules for all of these at any time. 
Consider initially two Cloud storage providers who both charge for the same 
transmission and storage costs for users. The user chooses one of the two providers 
and puts all of their data on to that Cloud. The costs paid so far is a one-time fee for 
transmission (this includes fees charged by the storage service provider and those 
charged by internet service providers), and an ongoing fee for storage. Consider 
further now that the other Cloud storage provider decides to reduce their storage 
fees as an incentive to attract business. The user is now faced with a dilemma of 
choosing to stay with their existing provider but pay higher long term costs, or pay 
an expensive transmission fee now (one time to download the data, and one time to 
upload the data) and move the data to the other provider in order to take advantage 
of the long term savings. Total transmission fees are typically higher than storage 
fees, as shown in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. This creates an economic barrier and 
condition which Abu-Libdeh et al. calls Storage Vendor Lock-in [3], where once a user 
commits to storing data in one provider they are no longer economically able to 
afford to move the data to a different provider without paying a hefty fee to move 
the data out. 
Even if the monetary price was free for all transmissions and storage, there is still a 
resource consumption problem with this method of moving between data storage 
providers. Considering that bandwidth is often a critical resource bottleneck for 
modern day Clouds and networks, it is ideal to reduce the bandwidth consumed for 
this task. A direct transfer between the providers can reduce overall resource 
consumption, however currently it is unforeseeable that there would be direct 
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connections and communications between Cloud storage providers due to business 
and competition. From an energy perspective, direct transfers would save electricity 
as well compared to downloading then re-uploading. 
A Cloud storage subsystem would have to keep in mind the market dynamics and 
work actively to prevent data lock in, while attempting to minimize a user’s costs for 
storing data on a Cloud. 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the risks, benefits, and costs of using Cloud storage. For files 
that are stored on the Cloud, they are at risk from malicious attacks from anywhere 
around the world, and at risk of being lost or corrupted due to service provider 
mistakes and equipment failures. Users must implicitly trust and depend upon the 
service provider to safeguard their files, and to provide uninterrupted access to the 
files.  Difference of interpretation of the notion of data privacy, as well as potentially 
conflicting laws around the world also play havoc to the Cloud storage ecosystem. 
Users may inadvertently have their privacy compromised if they place their files in 
the wrong geographical locations. 
Users can also benefit from placing files on the Cloud, including potential cost 
savings for start-up companies, improved global resource utilization, having world 
wide access to their files, having file versioning and recovery services, having data 
sharing services in team settings, and having an easy way to apply the principle of 
off-site data protection. 
We also presented a survey of the most popular internet service providers’ plans and 
rates in Canada and USA, as well as the costs charged by the most popular Cloud 
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storage providers for data stored beyond the free storage quota to show the financial 
costs a user encounters when using Cloud storage. We compared the costs to using 
local disk storage, and also discussed the economic effect of Storage Vendor Lock-in 
where users cannot move their data between service providers without having to pay 
a heavy fee. 
At the intersection of the risks, benefits, and costs, we can see that users must juggle 
a lot of factors to optimally take advantage of Cloud storage. The next chapter 





CHAPTER 4: CLOUD STORAGE PROBLEM 
DEFINITION 
From the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, we can see that users have very 
little control over their files and data stored on the Cloud, and are at the whims of 
Cloud storage providers in terms of service availability, data security, data privacy, 
and pricing. At the same time, there are numerous advantages to storing data on the 
Cloud, such as ease of access, off site back-ups, potential cost savings, and improved 
resource utilization. Users currently must make a conscious choice of accepting and 
facing these drawbacks in order to reap the benefits of storing data on the Cloud. 
Tackling this trade-off is the central problem for Cloud storage. 
We want to design a sound solution from a user’s perspective to resolve this trade-off 
in such a way that minimizes or eliminates as much of the problems as possible, 
while maintaining or enhancing the benefits of using Cloud storage. An ideal solution 
would eliminate all of the problems and enhance the benefits, so that users would no 
longer have to make this trade-off when they want to store files on the Cloud. 
To summarize the analysis, the risks and problems with using Cloud storage are: 
1. Malicious attacks can come from anywhere around the world, often targeting 
the authentication mechanism of Cloud storage providers 
2. Weak access control mechanisms may allow users to see other users’ data 
3. Routine maintenance or outages can cause inconveniences and delays 
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4. Data loss and corruption risk is always present due to equipment failure and 
potential natural disasters 
5. Implicit trust of storage providers necessary, but problematic as the control of 
the data resides on the service provider, while the responsibility for the data 
rests on the user 
6. Physical location of the Cloud data is unknown to the user, and users have no 
control over the physical placement of their data 
7. Economic and business models of Cloud providers often create problems of 
data lock-in and an inability for users to move data from one provider to 
another without paying high fees 
8. Changing pricing between Cloud providers is hard to track for users, and hard 
to optimize for a least-cost strategy since data move is currently necessary to 
take advantage of lower prices 
9. Requirements of local and international law may inadvertently violate a 
person’s reasonable expectation of data privacy 
The benefits of utilizing Cloud storage are: 
1. Pay only for the amount of data storage used 
2. Flexible storage quotas, adjusted on-demand 
3. Lower upfront costs, highly beneficial for start-up companies 
4. Reduced management and maintenance fees 
5. For short term projects, no need to worry about reselling hardware 
6. Improved resource utilization, saving energy for the world 
7. Access data from anywhere around the world 
8. Automatic storage of data backups and revisions 
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9. Ease platform for data sharing between users 
10. Changes are synchronized between a team when data is modified by team 
members 
11. An application of off-site data protection principle, allowing users to recover 
data easily 
Of the nine problems and risks outlined, the thesis will address all of them with the 
exception of problem 9. As previously discussed in Section 3.1.5 the solution to legal 
requirements necessitates political dialogue in both domestic and international 
settings to develop new standards and interpretations of the meaning of data privacy 
as well as tools for enforcement and compliance in an every increasingly online and 
connected world. 
The next chapter presents the approach and methodology for solving the trade-off 





CHAPTER 5: APPROACH AND 
METHODOLOGY 
A promising solution has been proposed by Abu-Libdeh et al. in their paper “RACS: A 
Case for Cloud Storage Diversity” [3]. In the paper, they present an approach to the 
trade-off problem by applying erasure code algorithms to split a user’s files into 
numerous pieces, add redundancy to these pieces to tolerate losses, and then send 
the file pieces to different Cloud providers. The focus of their paper was to resolve 
the economic issues of Cloud storage.  
We adopt this approach, and propose a more comprehensive system design 
Framework to resolve not only the economic issues but also the security, reliability, 
and privacy issues of storing data on the Cloud. The Framework provides a sound 
template design for a practical storage software system, which users can run on their 
computers and mobile devices to reap the benefits of using Cloud storage without 
having to worry about the problems mentioned Chapter 4. 
This chapter focuses on analyzing the approach, while Chapter 6 presents the 
Framework and detailed analysis of its components. This chapter begins by defining 
a formal model of erasure code file transformations in Section 5.1 to explain how 
erasure codes work in general. We then analyze Abu-Libdeh et al.’s approach and 
research work in Section 5.2 where we will mention the weaknesses of the approach. 
We explain a critical security problem which their work did not consider in Section 
5.3. Section 5.4 shows how such an approach can solve the trade-off problem, and 
Section 5.5 examines how the approach can augment and enhance the benefits of 
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using Cloud storage. Lastly Section 5.6 compares the approach to the current best 
practice from a user’s point of view. 
5.1 FORMAL MODEL OF ERASURE CODE FILE TRANSFORMATIONS 
Traditionally, erasure codes are used to add redundancy to small pieces of data, and 
then capture them in some form of a digital “container”. The container could be a 
single file, a set of files, a single network packet, or multiple packets, etc. This thesis 
focuses on using a set of equal size files as the container. Erasure codes add 
redundancy to the data in the encoding transformation process, and reconstruct the 
data in the decoding transformation process. Both processes are mathematically 
related. Only a subset of the file pieces are used since redundancy was added during 
the encoding transformation. 
 
Figure 3 – Erasure Code File Transformation Model 
There are many erasure codes in literature and in practice, each of them employing 
either different mathematical principles, or different configurations of the same 
principles [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53]. A general notation of (N, K) is used within 
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literature to denote the number of file pieces (N) generated in each encoding 
transformation, as well as the number of pieces (K) needed to reconstruct the original 
file in the decoding transformation. Generally, K is less than N to allow for (N – K) 
redundancy pieces. This is visualized in Figure 3, where a user’s file is encoded into N 








. Some codes must use a specific labeled subset 
of K pieces for the decoding transformation, while other codes can use any subset of 
K pieces. Generally speaking, the use of an erasure code involves more than simply 
implementing the transformation algorithm as proper management of the file pieces 
is necessary before any decoding transformations can occur. This often involves 
labeling all of the file pieces and capturing this information in a metadata file. 
Literature refers this type of mathematical transformation algorithms by various 
names in the domains of network coding, cryptographic systems, and storage 
systems. They have been called (N, K) channel codes, (N, K) error-correcting codes, (N, 
K)-threshold schemes, distributed key systems, secret sharing systems, and so on. 
The varied names are given to facilitate discussions with a focus in their respective 
domains. Erasure Code is another name for the same thing, commonly used within 
network coding and storage systems domains. The notion of an Erasure Code implies 
both the mathematical and computational algorithm used by the code, as well as the 
procedural use of the code. Erasure Codes must be configured for specific, valid, (N, 
K) pair values to be used. Whenever literature directly refers to an erasure code by 
name, they often imply a focused discussion on the algorithm aspect. When they 
refer to the code by a specific (N, K) configuration, they often imply a focused 
discussion on that configuration. This thesis focuses on both aspects of an Erasure 
Code, but they are discussed separately. 
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5.2 REDUNDANT ARRAY OF CLOUD STORAGE SYSTEM 
Abu-Libdeh et al. [3] of Cornell University approached the problem from an 
economics and data loss tolerance point of view. They developed a software system 
called Redundant Array of Cloud Storage (RACS) which uses the Reed-Solomon code 
[53] as its erasure code. Their efforts aim to give users the ability to tolerate service 
outages and data loss, adapt to ongoing price changes and provider availability in the 
marketplace, and control total storage costs. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
this is the first system which applies the approach specifically on Cloud storage 
problems, which made it interesting as a new application domain. 
Abu-Libdeh et al. discussed two economic benefits and one security benefit which 
this approach can offer, namely that it can help users avoid vendor lock-in, reduce 
the cost of switching service providers, and tolerate provider outages and failures. As 
validation and proof, their studies included a cost estimation and trace driven 
simulation of moving all of the data contained in the Internet Archive website to a 
new storage provider. Their simulation results showed up to 80% cost savings for 
service provider migration tasks. However, for normal uploads and downloads of 
files it showed an average increase of 50% in costs, corresponding to the efficiencies 
of their chosen Reed-Solomon code configurations. They did not specifically mention 
the reasons for choosing Reed-Solomon as the erasure code. 
A feature of RACS is its ability to operate through multiple running instances of the 
program, in parallel, within a server environment using Apache ZooKeeper as a 
distributed synchronization system between each instance. In this set up, RACS can 
service multiple users at the same time and avoid performance bottlenecks caused by 
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each instance since user requests can be serviced by another available instance. The 
architecture of RACS is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Redundant Array of Cloud Storage Architecture [3] 
Each RACS proxy instance contains a functional file transformation system, along 
with the management systems and communications systems to send the file pieces to 
various Cloud storage providers. Their system was implemented with a focus on 
being used on the Amazon S3 storage system. They wrote Repository Adaptors, or 
simply software APIs, which allow their system to work with other storage providers 
using a uniform interface. 
The paper mentions the use of “policy hints” to capture user preferences of which 
storage providers to use. It also mentions a key point to combine user preference 
with the need to load balance between the storage providers in order to achieve 
optimal economic freedom and data security. 
Chapter 5: Approach and Methodology 
57 
A software performance analysis was also carried out by Abu-Libdeh et al. showing 
encoding throughput of 95MB/s and decoding throughput of 151MB/s using an open 
source erasure coding library called Zfec on a 2GHz Intel Core 2 Duo powered 
computer. Zfec includes an implementation of the Reed-Solomon Code. Relative to 
end users, these throughput rates are fast since the expected internet throughputs 
are much slower. As a software system installed on end users’ computers, the 
performance bottleneck would be on their internet connection. In corporate settings 
where high speed and high performance networks might be common, the 
throughputs might cause delays if the network supports 1 Gigabit/s or higher 
bandwidths. 
There were three main weaknesses of the approach mentioned in the paper. First, the 
total storage space used increases by a factor of N ÷ K, which results in higher 
transmission costs and storage costs. Second, the number of requests issued to the 
Cloud increases by a factor of N since every file piece is treated and considered to be 
a file by the storage provider. Operations such as creating and deleting files must 
wait for all requests to complete. Lastly, the system introduces latency as all files 
must undergo encoding and decoding transformations. 
This thesis makes a number of contributions and improvements to the work done by 
Abu-Libdeh et al. First, we examined in much more depth the security issues and 
economic problems of using Cloud storage in Chapters 2 and 3. In Sections 5.4 and 
5.5, we will show how to resolve all of these problems using the approach. Second, 
the research work from Abu-Libdeh et al. does not state how they manage their 
metadata on the files, for which this thesis proposes a solution in the form of using a 
peer-to-peer network to replicate the metadata across a user’s devices. Third, their 
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research work does not state why they specifically chose Reed-Solomon coding as the 
erasure code. This thesis examines families and classes of erasure codes in Chapter 6 
to study the security properties and performance of different erasure codes, as well 
as their applicability towards Cloud storage problems. Lastly, we contrast this 
approach to traditional remote storage paradigms in Chapter 7. 
5.3 THE DICTIONARY ATTACK PROBLEM 
Encoding files into file pieces can still present a cryptographic security problem, one 
which was not discussed by Abu-Libdeh et al. Given a sufficient number of file pieces 
less than the threshold K and external knowledge about the data, one could plausibly 
guess at the data of any missing pieces with very high accuracy. Any missing pieces 
required to meet the threshold could be deduced without having to obtain them from 
the Cloud. This is called the dictionary attack in security research. Consider the 
following example: 
Let the original file contain the word PASSWORD, and consider that it is split into 
four pieces consisting of PA, SS, WO, and RD. If an attacker obtains any 3 of these 
blocks – for example __SSWORD, PA__WORD, PASS__RD, or PASSWO__ – the 
remaining block can be guessed quite easily using an English language dictionary 
search. In this case, the attacker has external knowledge about the data, namely that 
the contents are English words and that in total there are 8 characters. If an attacker 
obtains any 2 of the blocks – for example ____WORD, __SS__RD, or __SSWO__ – 
guessing becomes more difficult. Some plausible English words fitting ____WORD 
might be BUZZWORD or FOREWORD. If the attacker did not know how many 
characters there were in total, then words such as CROSSWORD, SWORD, and 
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AFTERWORD are also plausible guesses. Having more plausible results increases the 
chances of the attacker failing to obtain the true original data. 
Some erasure codes will encode a file in such a way that none of the file pieces 
contain, directly, the text or data in the original file. For the above example, these 
types of erasure codes would encode PASSWORD to another set of characters, such 
as WR, SL, AB, and EK. These codes have the Confusion security property, while 
others such as Reed-Solomon Codes do not have the property. 
5.4 ADDRESSING SECURE CLOUD STORAGE PROBLEMS 
By splitting and spreading out the pieces of the file to multiple Cloud storage 
providers (at least two providers), the problems outlined in Chapter 4 can be 
addressed. We examine each problem one at a time: 
1. Malicious attacks can come from anywhere around the world, often 
targeting the authentication mechanism of Cloud storage providers 
An attacker must obtain at least K of the N pieces of files in order to accomplish his 
or her objective of obtaining the original file, presuming that this original file 
contains highly valuable and sensitive information to both the user and the attacker. 
If the N pieces are spread out in such a way that we ensure no single Cloud provider 
has K pieces, then the attacker must compromise at least as many Cloud providers at 
the same time as it takes to obtain the K pieces necessary. By convention, this is at 
least two providers. If the attacker were to attempt to break the authentication 
mechanisms of the providers at different times, then it becomes and ever 
increasingly difficult for every subsequent attack as companies and users will have 
the time to react to the first attack to further safeguard their systems and data. 
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Further, it can also be presumed that the attack against one provider will not work 
against another provider without significant adaptation. While there are common 
security best practices used by all companies, the specific security architecture of 
each provider is different, which necessitates a different way of attacking that 
provider. While it is theoretically impossible to prevent simultaneous attacks, nor the 
complete elimination of this risk, the Framework will further minimize the risk of 
malicious attacks as it increases the amount of work necessary for attackers before 
they can achieve their objectives, compared to the current practice of putting all of 
the data on a single Cloud storage provider. 
2. Weak access control mechanisms may allow users to see other users’ data 
When a Cloud storage provider has a weak access control mechanism, the ultimate 
solution is for that provider to modify and improve their mechanism so that users 
cannot see each other’s data. Since the Framework only allows less than K file pieces 
to be stored on each Cloud provider, other users would not be able to reconstruct the 
original file without obtaining the remaining pieces from another compromised 
Cloud storage provider. It is unlikely for any two Cloud storage providers to have the 
same access control weaknesses, as their architectures would have some differences 
to avoid legal copyright problems. Further, even if two Cloud storage providers 
would have such weaknesses, it is unlikely that they would have it at the same time. 
3. Routine maintenance or outages can cause inconveniences and delays 
System maintenances and temporary outages do occur with Cloud storage providers 
for many reasons. Sometimes their entire system must undergo an update at the 
same time, whereby they cannot schedule piecewise updates to their subsystems. 
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Sometimes it could occur due to electrical outages or other unforeseen events. The 
management plan and system architecture of the provider’s service often have the 
most direct impact towards the frequency maintenance activities. Thus the direct 
solution to reducing outages and maintenance rests with better management plans 
and architectures that allow for piece-wise upgrades to their systems. When a 
maintenance or outage occurs for a specific Cloud provider, the Framework can 
reconstruct the pieces stored in that provider by downloading the necessary file 
pieces from the other Cloud providers. Erasure codes not only allow the 
reconstruction of the entire file, but also the pieces. Some of the code algorithms will 
require a complete reconstruction of the file followed by re-splitting the file into new 
pieces, while other codes can allow piece wise reconstruction using specific pieces. By 
reconstructing the pieces stored in the Cloud provider experiencing an outage, the 
user can continue to have access to the original file and data while the Cloud 
provider fixes their systems. 
4. Data loss and corruption risk is always present due to equipment failure 
and potential natural disasters 
Piecewise file reconstruction can also be used to safeguard against complete data 
loss or corruption due to equipment failure and damaging natural disasters. 
Complete data loss can be treated the same as a maintenance outage, whereby the 
system simply reconstructs the missing pieces. The system can compute the hash 
value of each file piece, and use that to check against the stored hash values in the 
metadata for those pieces to verify that the pieces have not been modified while 
being stored on the Cloud. If any checks fail, the corrupted pieces can be 
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reconstructed using the remaining file pieces as long as K total pieces or more are 
intact. 
If less than K total pieces remain intact, then the system will not be able to 
reconstruct the file from the pieces, but if an original copy was retained by the user 
then it could reconstruct the pieces by splitting the original file again. 
5. Implicit trust of storage providers necessary, but problematic as the control 
of the data resides on the service provider, while the responsibility for the 
data rests on the user 
The Framework can treat the file and data to help it tolerate against attacks on a 
storage provider, against weaker system design where user’s files might be viewed by 
other users, against system outages, and against total data loss and corruption of a 
single provider. Depending on the way the system distributes the specific file pieces, 
the files can tolerate problems present in multiple providers at the same time. For 
example, where one provider experiences accidentally deletes a user’s file piece, 
while another provider experiences an equipment failure. However, as K file pieces 
must remain intact, some subset of the total number of providers must remain 
functioning. The implicit dependency and need to trust a single storage provider can 
effectively be eliminated; however the ecosystem of providers must still be 
trustworthy and generally reliable. Since the user can recover all data from the K file 
pieces, they now have the ultimate control over all of their data. If all providers are 
neither reliable nor trustworthy, the Framework would work better by sending the 
file pieces to multiple local storage mediums, such as USB flash drives, to safeguard 
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against equipment failure. In such a case, Cloud storage itself would have a systemic 
issue within the entire ecosystem. 
6. Physical location of the Cloud data is unknown to the user, and users have 
no control over the physical placement of their data 
The specific physical location of a user’s data within a Cloud is very much 
undeterminable from a user’s perspective. On the one hand, the lack of such 
knowledge safeguards users from any potential physical attacks of data centers, 
since attackers wouldn’t know which data center to target to steal hard drives. On the 
other hand, most of the major Cloud storage providers are expanding worldwide with 
physical data centers in all major continents, and even choosing a provider does not 
necessarily imply choosing the continents, countries, or cities of where the data 
would be stored. However, numerous small Cloud storage providers exist, providing 
storage services tailored for specialized markets, for example CareCloud is a specific 
Cloud storage provider for health care data in USA, which claims to be HIPPA 
certified for US law requirements [54]. HIPPA specifically requires providers to track 
the physical movement and locations of any healthcare data within their systems 
[55], and to be able to audit and verify such movements [56]. 
The Framework takes into account the geographic locations of each Cloud storage 
provider, which can give users control of the physical placement of their data to 
some degree. Efforts to track and locate all of the physical locations of the data 
centers for each Cloud provider may be necessary in order to completely address this 
problem, however the efforts would be exhaustive if done by manual labour, and the 
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correctness of the report will deteriorate through time as companies expand or 
relocate their data centers. 
7. Economic and business models of Cloud providers often create problems of 
data lock-in and an inability for users to move data from one provider to 
another without paying high fees 
Recall the scenario discussed earlier in Section 3.3.4, where the user has their data in 
the more expensive of two Cloud storage service providers. The user is faced with a 
dilemma of either paying higher long term costs by staying with their current 
provider, or an expensive transfer fee (outbound and inbound fees from providers 
and download and upload fees from internet service provider) to move their files to 
the less expensive of the two Cloud storage providers for long term savings. The 
Framework lets the user reconstruct the file pieces stored on the expensive provider 
locally on their computer, and then upload these directly to the less expensive 
provider. The user doesn’t have to pay a download fee or an outbound data fee in 
order to take advantage of the savings. Although an upload fee and inbound data fee 
is still present, the total cost is less. The system can compute the time period for 
which the new storage cost plus move cost is equal to the storage cost of the former 
storage provider. Intuitively, storing a file on the Cloud any time after this time 
period will result in cost savings compared to staying with the current provider. A 
move can be made if the file is expected to be stored in the Cloud longer than the 
computed time period. We present this in further detail in Section 6.5.1. The 
reduction of the total cost is in one sense an economic freedom which the user can 
take advantage of through the Framework. 
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8. Changing pricing between Cloud providers is hard to track for users, and 
hard to optimize for a least-cost strategy since data move is currently 
necessary to take advantage of lower prices 
The Framework will automatically track Cloud storage and internet prices, thus 
alleviates the need for the users to track the price changes. With all the available 
pricing data, the system can intelligently formulate a dynamic least-cost strategy 
balancing pricing, storage, and security requirements. Data move in the form 
discussed here in point 7 is still necessary to take advantage of lower storage prices, 
but the system will intelligently decide when and where to move the files according 
to all of the requirements. 
5.5 PRESERVING CLOUD STORAGE BENEFITS 
The Framework preserves all existing benefits of storing data on the Cloud, and also 
enhances some of the benefits in intuitive ways. The benefits outlined in Chapter 4 
are examined point by point below to see how the system will preserve or enhance 
the benefits. 
1. Pay only for the amount of data storage used 
The Framework will still allow the user to pay only for the amount of data storage 
used on the Cloud. Although the system does compute extra file pieces for the 
advantages of redundancy and security, the location and placement of these pieces 
could be on or off the Cloud. It is a flexible option for the user as to how many file 
pieces should be placed on the Cloud, and as a result how much costs they can 
expect by placing the file pieces on the Cloud. For example, if we only put less than K 
file pieces on the Cloud where K pieces constitute the size of the original file, then 
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the system allows the user to save on costs by not having to put as much data on the 
Cloud compared to using Cloud storage in the traditional sense. 
2. Flexible storage quotas, adjusted on-demand 
Since the Framework aims to distribute the file pieces across a number of storage 
providers as a security principle, indirectly this allows the user to not need to request 
for higher storage quotas from each provider, and generally remain lower in costs. Of 
the surveyed storage providers shown in Section 3.3.2, only Amazon and Microsoft 
has lower effective price per GB stored as a user requests for a higher quota. The 
other providers charge the same unit price at any storage tier. All of these providers 
have a free storage tier, thus the system can optimize costs by distributing the file 
pieces in such a way that it wouldn’t use more than the free storage quota of space 
from each provider until there is no more free space remaining. The system can 
intelligently take advantage of the free storage spaces available in the Cloud storage 
market. 
3. Lower upfront costs, highly beneficial for start-up companies 
With sufficient market research and indexing, the Framework will contain a wealth of 
knowledge of the pricing, free storage limits, security features, and legal restrictions 
set by each storage provider for the data they host on their Clouds. Within this data 
set, the system could be used as a recommendation system where it suggests to the 
user where to place their data, how much storage it needs, and the costs to expect. 
From the perspective of a start-up company, the system could be advantageous in 
keeping start-up costs low by intelligently finding additional free or low cost storage 
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tiers and providers with suitable requirements for the business as its data storage 
needs grow. 
4. Reduced management and maintenance fees 
The aim of the Framework is to be as intelligent and automated as possible in 
managing the distribution and reassembly of the required file pieces, thus very little 
management work or interaction would be needed from the user once some initial 
configuration work is completed. Like most other existing Cloud storage tools and 
solutions, automation and machine intelligence reduces the amount of management 
and maintenance work on the overall file system which allows users to save time and 
companies to save costs. 
5. For short term projects, no need to worry about reselling hardware 
The Framework continues to allow users and companies not have to worry about 
reselling storage hardware as all of those costs are bear by the Cloud storage 
provider. The implementation of the system can be accomplished by a wide range of 
software languages for various architectures and platforms. The user does not need 
to invest in any specialized hardware in order to use this Framework.  
6. Improved resource utilization, saving energy for the world 
One of the main reasons for users to pre-emptively purchase a very large storage 
capacity hard disk is to accommodate any unexpected or unknown future storage 
needs. For portable computers it also makes sense to increase the storage capacity 
available given that there is usually space only for one or two hard disks per laptop. 
For desktops or older computers, it makes sense to consolidate many smaller 
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capacity hard disks into one large one for the purpose of saving energy and reducing 
weight. The use of Cloud storage extends the capacity limit since most files could be 
offloaded onto the Cloud. In one sense, a storage system that intelligently capitalizes 
on this flexibility can even maximize the utilization of local storage by finding the 
files that could be offloaded onto the Cloud and moving them automatically. Not 
only can the user have a virtually unlimited storage space, but the local hard disks 
can become smaller in actual storage capacity, reducing the global demand for the 
scares resources needed to produce so many high capacity but underutilized hard 
disks. Likewise, sending more files, including the redundant file pieces to the Cloud 
allows a Cloud provider to maximize their storage disk utilization and increase 
revenue. 
7. Access data from anywhere around the world 
Since the Framework uses metadata to keep track of where the file pieces are and the 
metadata is replicated across the user’s devices through a peer-to-peer file system, 
the user is guaranteed to have access to their data anywhere around the world as 
long as they have an internet connection. 
8. Automatic storage of data backups and revisions 
The Framework can work in conjunction with already available backup and revision 
capable Cloud storage systems to archive versions of a file. In such settings, the 
Framework will simply split the updated file into the same number of resultant file 
pieces as the original file, and name them accordingly such that the Cloud storage 
systems register the new file pieces as a revision of their corresponding old file 
pieces. 
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Some erasure code algorithms can work with incremental changes to an original file, 
by computing the respective changes to each of the resultant file pieces. Using only 
these algorithms, the system can upload the new file pieces to the storage providers 
and add a corresponding entry in the metadata to track the revision of the file. This 
approach restricts the list of applicable algorithms, but can be used across any 
number of Cloud storage providers as the revision capability is provided by the 
Framework instead of the Cloud providers, and this approach is likely the most 
efficient in terms of the use of storage space. 
9. Ease platform for data sharing between users 
Users who share the same file will need to exchange the metadata and use the same 
storage system. Since the metadata is shared through a peer-to-peer network, the 
authorized users’ devices and computers can be added as peers to the file’s P2P 
network in order to receive the metadata. When sharing for specific files or folders 
stops, the Framework disconnects the relevant peers from the P2P networks and 
gracefully handles the files. 
10. Changes are synchronized between a team when data is modified by team 
members 
The metadata can also be used to track changes, in such a way that the team 
members only need to download the K pieces necessary to reconstruct the new 
updated file instead of all pieces. 
11. An application of off-site data protection principle, allowing users to 
recover data easily 
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The Framework further enhances a user’s ability to recover data through the 
application of the off-site data protection principle. Not only will it allow the user to 
tolerate their own hardware or system failure, but also failures of individual Cloud 
storage providers. As long as K pieces remain intact anywhere around the world, the 
user can recover their files. 
5.6 CURRENT USER BEST PRACTICES 
From a user’s point of view, the current best practice is to simply encrypt all their 
files before putting them on the Cloud. This is often advocated by many consumer 
websites and blogs [57] along with suggestions and promotions of specific 
encryption software. These blog posts serve as a good means to raise awareness of 
the problems of Cloud storage, stimulate community discussions, and generally 
educating consumers on the ideas of encryption. However, there are a number of 
drawbacks to this methodology. The user must learn about encryption systems to 
properly apply encryption to their files, or implicitly trust the encryption software. 
Encrypting files involve selecting an appropriate encryption algorithm and system, 
determining the level of security needed and select a proper length of an encryption 
key corresponding to the level, and then apply the system in the proper procedure to 
encrypt the file. The user must also manage the encryption keys, and trust whomever 
they share the keys with if they want to share the files. If a user loses his or her 
encryption key, there is a likely chance that they will never be able to decrypt their 
files. Even if these steps were taken, it does not guarantee that an attacker won’t 
obtain their data. If an attacker obtains a complete copy of the encrypted file, they 
may expend as much computational resources and time as needed to decrypt the file 
through brute force or other techniques.  
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The erasure code approach solves this problem by spreading the pieces among many 
Cloud providers, forcing an attacker to execute coordinated and concurrent attacks 
to multiple providers. This increases significantly the difficulty and amount of work 
necessary for an attacker to gain access to the data. 
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the approach to solve the Cloud storage problem which 
applies erasure code algorithms to split a user’s files into numerous pieces, add 
redundancy to these pieces to tolerate losses, and then send the file pieces to 
different Cloud providers. The approach is an adaptation of the approach used by 
Abu-Libdeh et al. in their RACS system. We presented a formal model of erasure code 
file transformations to explain how erasure codes work at a high level, then we 
analyzed Abu-Libdeh et al.’s research work. We showed how their work was missing 
critical analysis in terms of data security by presenting the Dictionary Attack 
Problem, which shows a critical vulnerability in their system as attackers can guess 
missing file pieces given that they obtain a sufficient amount of data pieces. 
We then addressed point by point how the approach itself can be used to resolve the 
risks and challenges of using Cloud storage, whilst enhancing the benefits. We also 
analyzed the current best practices for users, showing how despite the benefits of 
increasing awareness and educating the population about the risks of Cloud storage, 
the best practices still has vulnerabilities. 
In the next chapter, we apply the approach by presenting the design and in-depth 
analysis of a system Framework that resolves the Cloud storage problem.  
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CHAPTER 6: CLOUD STORAGE 
FRAMEWORK 
Designing a secure storage software Framework requires a thorough analysis of each 
of the components of the Framework. This chapter begins with a presentation and 
discussion of the components of the Framework in Section 6.1. The most critical 
component is the erasure code transformation system which carries out the encoding 
and decoding operations on files. The analysis metrics for erasure codes are 
presented in Section 6.2, followed by an in depth analysis of seven erasure codes in 
Section 6.3. The other components are described in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively, 
followed by the chapter summary in Section 6.6. 
6.1 GENERAL MODEL OF FRAMEWORK 
A Cloud storage Framework is a template software system which takes some user 
files(s) as input, and transforms them into a proper set of file pieces as output to be 
stored on the Cloud, in such a way that some redundancy is added to afford data 
loss, corruption, service outage, or equipment failure. A high level representation is 
shown in Figure 5. The Framework has four high level systems. The erasure code 









The Cloud storage management system selects Cloud providers and manages the 
upload and download of the file pieces to a number of Cloud providers. The choice of 
Cloud storage providers depend on their price, availability, geography, security, and 
other metrics. The choice is independent of the encoding and decoding 
transformations. Thus the system is able to tailor the choices of storage providers 
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towards any number of requirements, whether it is for law compliance, cost 
reduction, data security, or a combination thereof. 
 
Figure 5 – General Model of Cloud Storage Framework 
In fact, the choice of a storage provider could also include local and offline sources 
such as the user’s hard drives, memory cards, rewritable optical disks, and USB 
drives. For the purposes of discussion we consider only Cloud providers as storage 
providers, but the Framework is not constrained to only use online providers. In fact 
the substitution can be advantageous in certain scenarios. 
Since K out of N file pieces are required for the decoding transformation, the storage 
management function will always put fewer than K file pieces in a single Cloud 
storage provider for the security of the user’s data. More strictly, the system will put 
fewer than R = (N – K) file pieces in each Cloud provider so that the complete loss of 
a provider does not affect the ability to recover or reconstruct the original file. The 
system can enforce a constraint that R < K, due to these two security and reliability 
principles. 
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The Framework will create some metadata in the form of a file which captures the 
information of which specific erasure code was used to transform the file, and which 
Clouds are storing the file pieces. Metadata files are synchronized across the user’s 
devices by the Metadata Synchronization System through a peer-to-peer network 
consisting of only the user’s devices. The metadata files are replicated across the 
peer-to-peer network so that the user always has the metadata on hand, along with 
the system software, to access their files on the Cloud. The system assumes that at 
any time, at least two peers are alive and can connect to each other to replicate the 
metadata. 
Lastly, the Encryption System applies file level encryption to the metadata files, user 
files, and file pieces. Depending on the Framework configuration, encryption could 
either be applied before transformation operations. No matter what, the Framework 
requires file pieces to be encrypted prior to being uploaded to the Cloud. 
6.2 ERASURE CODE ALGORITHM PROPERTIES AND METRICS 
The core component of the Framework is the erasure code used to encode and 
decode a file. This single component affects the security of the file, the potential 
costs to store the file, and the performance of the system. Since many erasure codes 
exist, it is worthy to analyze and compare a chosen representative sample of erasure 
codes to see their security properties, algorithmic properties, efficiencies, and 
theoretical performance limits in the domain of splitting and joining large size files. 
We focus on the algorithm aspect of each code in this section. 
A set of erasure codes has been chosen based upon their popularity of use in 
industry, as well as their underlying mathematical principles. This selection criterion, 
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although not explicitly rigorous, follows the trends within the erasure codes research 
community. The majority of literature within this field can be traced back to a few 
canonical erasure codes, where earlier research works define and improve upon the 
codes from a theoretical point of view and latter research works improve the run-
time performance of the codes and demonstrate their applications. The selection 
favors the canonical codes more than their refinements since the mathematics 
underlying the codes establish their algorithmic properties and theoretical 
performance limits. Comparing codes at these limits gives the Framework a rational 
means to pick an erasure code to use, given a user’s situation or preference. Users 
may prefer to have their overall system run fast, which implies favor towards codes 
which encode and decode in linear time. Users may also prefer codes which are 
highly flexible, which implies favor towards codes that can be customized to produce 
any K number of redundant pieces relative to some division of the original file into M 
pieces. In practice, any implementation of the Framework can incorporate the latter 
refinements for each type of erasure code to maximize the system’s performance.  
The very first erasure code was invented by Richard Hamming in 1950 [48] using 
parity check in fixed positions to allow for either the detection or automatic 
correction of bit errors. Parity check is implemented in computers via the Exclusive 
OR (XOR, ⊕) operation. In fact, many modern erasure codes are based upon the use 
of XOR in different arrangements, for example RAID-5 erasure algorithm and Low 
Density Parity Code (LDPC). Shamir’s Secret Sharing Algorithm is based on 
polynomial interpolation. Michael Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) is 
based upon a matrix multiplication and matrix inversion process. Reed-Solomon 
codes are based upon polynomial multiplication and division over a Galois Field. 
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Recall from earlier in Section 2.2.1 a few important definitions. We defined K as the 
number of file pieces split from an original file, R as the number of redundancy file 
pieces added by an erasure code algorithm, and N as the total number of file pieces 
where N = K + R. Also, recall the definitions of Resultant Size Factor, Redundancy 
Factor, and the Redundancy Minimization Functions as follows: 
                       











   
 




We can view the Framework as follows: for a given erasure code algorithm, a desired 
redundancy factor RF, and an appropriately chosen number of original file pieces K, 
the algorithm will add R redundancy file pieces. 
With respect to a chosen RF, each algorithm can add a different number of redundant 
file pieces, or add them differently. The aim of Section 6.3 is to compare different 
algorithms for their algorithmic properties and theoretical performance at different 
chosen RF values, as an equalizing factor. RF directly corresponds to the security and 
reliability of the file, namely how many pieces can be lost in the set of N pieces 
before the file becomes unrecoverable through a decoding operation. 
In this section, we begin by first defining a few constant properties which all 
algorithms share, then describe all comparison metrics point by point to show why 
these metrics are important to consider for the problem. 
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6.2.1 COMMON ALGORITHM PROPERTIES AND MATHEMATICAL 
CONSTANTS 
We use |F| to denote the size of the original file. A file F will be divided into K equal 
size pieces by any erasure code algorithm. We denote the size of each file piece as |K|. 
Logically, the size of each file piece is the size of the file divided by K. As such one 
constant holds throughout all erasure code algorithms: 
Equation 5 – File Piece Size Constant 




Further, while the number of redundancy file pieces can change for each algorithm, 
we hold the size of each piece constant and to be the same as each original file piece, 
that is: 
Equation 6 – Redundancy File Size Constant 
| |  | | 
This constant property will become evident in Section 6.3 as we examine each 
algorithm in detail. We can further denote the total size of the resultant set of file 
pieces as |N|, which can be calculated as follows: 
Equation 7 – Resultant File Size 
| |  | |    | |    
6.2.2 ALGORITHM ANALYSIS METRICS 
There are 14 important metrics which we use to analyze each of the seven erasure 
codes in order to determine their properties, efficiencies, and suitability for solving 
the Cloud storage problem. The number of erasure codes in literature and in practice 
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can be countless. This set of metrics can be used by interested researchers and 
readers to analyze other erasure codes for their suitability to this problem.  
Let us define the algorithm comparison metrics point by point as follows: 
1. File Reconstruction Threshold 
The file reconstruction threshold FT is the number of pieces within N needed to 
reconstruct the original file F. For most erasure code algorithms FT = K. 
2. File Piece Reconstruction Threshold 
The file piece reconstruction threshold PT is the minimum number of pieces within N 
needed to reconstruct one other piece within N. 
3. Resultant Space 
The resultant space is the total space taken up by a file after applying the encoding 
transformation to the file. It is the same as |N|, and is expressed in units of Bytes of 
computer data. Generally we will consider data of sizes in Megabytes (MB), Gigabytes 
(GB), Terabytes (TB), and Petabytes (PB) as these are the most prevalent size units 
found in 2014. 
4. Resultant Space Factor 
This is previously defined in Section 2.2.1. From a more intuitive standpoint, the 
resultant space factor is the size of the resultant file |N| divided by the size of the 
original file |F|. Since |N| is a function of |F|, we can express it as we have in Equation 1 
in Section 2.2.1 as N ÷ K. 
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5. Redundancy Factor 
This is also previously defined in Section 2.2.1. The redundancy factor is the number 
of redundancy file pieces R divided by the number of total number of file pieces N, 
expressed as a percentage. 
6. Encoding Time 
The encoding time is the amount of time necessary to encode a given file into its 
corresponding N file pieces. Encoding involves four steps of splitting the file into K 
pieces, and computing and creating R redundancy pieces. This is expressed as a 
function of |F|. Generally, a faster encoding time makes an algorithm better since it 
uses less CPU cycles, reducing resource consumption, and results in less waiting time 
for a user. 
7. Decoding Time 
The decoding time is the amount of time necessary to decode a given set of K file 
pieces back to the original file. This is also expressed as a function of |F|. A faster 
decoding time makes an algorithm better for the same reasons as Encoding Time. 
8. Temporary Space for Encoding 
Erasure code algorithms require a certain amount of memory or temporary file 
storage space to compute each encoding operation. This amount of space is defined 
as the Temporary Space for Encoding (TSE), expressed as a function of |K|. Lower TSE 
makes an algorithm more useful as it can be implemented in platforms which have 
less memory or disk space, such as a mobile phone. 
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9. Temporary Space for Decoding 
Similarly, erasure code algorithms also require temporary memory or file spaces for 
the decoding operation. We define this space as the Temporary Space for Decoding 
(TSD), expressed as a function of |K|. Lower TSD is desirable for the same reasons as 
TSE. 
10. Confusion Property 
Recalling the definitions provided in Section 2.2.2, an erasure code algorithm has the 
confusion property if the output file pieces have complex mathematical relationships 
to the input file, and if none of the output file pieces directly correspond to the input 
pieces. For example, a code which computes some redundancy pieces and adds them 
to the original file would not be considered to have the Confusion Property because 
the output file contains the input file in plain text, without transforming it at all. 
Such types of codes do not have a complex relationship between the output and 
input files as far as the contents of the file are concerned. 
11. Diffusion Property 
An erasure code algorithm has the diffusion property if each bit of the input file is 
involved in computing all bits of each output file piece by the algorithm. Specifically, 
Diffusion is achieved if each input bit is mathematically involved in all output bits. 
12. Partial Updates 
An erasure code algorithm has this property if for a given update operation 
performed on the original file it does not need to recompute every output piece from 
scratch in order to update the output file pieces. 
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13. Metadata Requirement – Computation Key 
A computation key is required by an erasure code algorithm if it must keep some 
numerical constants or data in the metadata file in order to mathematically perform 
the decoding procedure. An algorithm is more robust if it does not need a 
computation key, however this key can also offer an extra layer of security for the 
user since an attacker must also obtain the key before they can decode the file. 
14. Metadata Requirement – File Reconstruction Relation Table 
A file reconstruction relation table is required by an erasure code algorithm if it must 
use certain specific file pieces to reconstruct other file pieces in the set of N pieces, 
regardless of whether they are the original or redundancy pieces. More generally, an 
ordered reconstruction procedure is necessary for the algorithm to recompute the 
original file. An algorithm does not require this table if it does not require an ordered 
reconstruction. An algorithm is more robust if it does not require this table since it 
can begin reconstruction as soon as the first piece is downloaded, however it 
becomes easier for an attacker as well since it no longer needs to obtain specific file 
pieces to reconstruct the other specific pieces within the file set. 
6.3 ALGORITHM ANALYSIS 
This section begins with an introduction of each erasure code algorithm along with 
their detailed analysis in Sections 6.3.1 through 6.3.7, and concludes with a 
comparative analysis of the algorithms in Section 6.3.8. For the purpose of a naive 
comparison, the “Simple Replication” algorithm is presented first to provide a basic 
reference point for all erasure code algorithms. Technically, Simple Replication is not 
an erasure code algorithm. 
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6.3.1 SIMPLE REPLICATION 
To perform Simple Replication, users simply have to copy their original file as many 
times as they desire to achieve a particular redundancy factor. For example, if an RF 
of 50% is desired, the user copies their file once, such that 1 file out of the 2 is 
redundant. If an RF of 66% is desired, the user copies their file twice so that 2 files 
out of the 3 are redundant. 
Its reconstruction thresholds PT and FT are always 1 since any copy is a true copy of 
the original. The resultant space is the number of copies time the size of the original 
file, thus |N| = N × |F|; resulting in a RSF of |N| ÷ |F| = N. Its redundancy factor RF is (N 
– 1) ÷ N as all pieces except one is redundant. 
Mathematically speaking, every bit of an output file is the same as its corresponding 
bit in the input file. Thus, the encoding operation of creating N replicas involve a 
linear time operation to duplicate the data, and the encoding time is O(|F|). The 
decoding operation requires no computation, so the decoding time is O(1). The 
temporary memory space required for encoding is 0 since the operating system can 
manage the copy operation. The temporary memory space required for decoding is 
also 0. 
Simple replication does not have confusion nor diffusion properties since an attacker 
can obtain the data if it obtains any copy of the file. Partial updates are supported 
since only the bits that are changed in an original file need to be updated in the 
duplicate copies. Simple replication does not need a computation key, and it does not 
need a file reconstruction relation table.  
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Table 10 shows the redundancy performance of using Simple Replication. As RF 
increases, the set of files contain more redundancy which means it is more tolerant 
to errors and losses. This is generally favorable for users who want more data 
security in their files. RSF shows the cost of attaining each level of data security, 
directly showing the amount of redundancy there is in the set of files. The ratio of 
RSF to RF shows the relative cost to attain each level of data security. Intuitively, 
using as few redundant copies as possible gives us the best performance, resulting in 
a lower RSF/RF ratio. 
Table 10 – Simple Replication Configurations and Redundancy Performance 
Simple Replication is trivially fast and allows partial updates. However, it costs a lot 
of storage space compared to the use of erasure code algorithms. 
6.3.2 HAMMING CODE 
Published in 1950, Richard Hamming introduced the world’s very first erasure code 
while he was trying to solve the practical problem of allowing a system to 
automatically correct bit errors caused by analog data transmission, or noise [48]. His 
code is called the Hamming Code in literature, in honour of his name. In his original 
incarnation, known now as the (7, 4) Hamming Code, 3 error correction bits are 
Simple Replication (N, K) R N K RSF RF RSF/RF 
(2, 1) 1 2 1 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(3, 1) 2 3 1 3.0000 0.6667 4.5000 
(4, 1) 3 4 1 4.0000 0.7500 5.3333 
(5, 1) 4 5 1 5.0000 0.8000 6.2500 
(6, 1) 5 6 1 6.0000 0.8333 7.2000 
(7, 1) 6 7 1 7.0000 0.8571 8.1667 
(8, 1) 7 8 1 8.0000 0.8750 9.1429 
(9, 1) 8 9 1 9.0000 0.8889 10.1250 
(10, 1) 9 10 1 10.0000 0.9000 11.1111 
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calculated and arranged for 4 data bits (D1, D2, D3, D4) according to the following 
table: 
Table 11 – (7, 4) Hamming Code Computation Table 
It is known as the (7, 4) Hamming Code because in total there are 7 bits for every 4 
data bits. Hamming Codes parity bits are set at any position that is a power of 2, that 
is bit position 2m for m = 0, 1, 2, … Each parity bit correspondingly computes the XOR 
of all bit positions which have the m least significant bit set to 1. 
In the example of Table 11, bit positions 3, 5, and 7 correspondingly have binary 
position values of 11, 101, and 111. The parity bit at position 1, with a corresponding 
m of 0, would calculate the XOR of all bits with the least significant bit having a value 
of 1, which is position 3, 5, 7. Hence, as shown, it computes the XOR of D1, D2, and 
D4. Similarly, the parity bit at position 2 with m = 1 computes the XOR of all bits with 
the second least significant bit having a value of 1, which is positions 3, 6, and 7. 
The (7, 4) Hamming Code can correct a single error bit. For example if bit 5 (D2) was 
has an error (its bit value was flipped), then bits 4, 6, and 7 can be used to compute 
D2. Mathematically, (D2 ⊕ D3 ⊕ D4) ⊕ D3 ⊕ D4 = D2 since the XOR of any bit with 
itself is 0, and any bit XOR 0 is the value of that bit. The Code then uses the other 
parity bit which D2 is involved in to check that D2 was computed correctly, in this 
case parity bit 1. Let’s denote the newly computed D2 value as D2’. It checks that  
P1 = D1 ⊕ D2 ⊕ D4 = D1 ⊕ D2’ ⊕ D4. In this code, 3 bits are used to compute or 
Bit Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bit Position Binary Value 1 10 11 100 101 110 111 
Bit Type Parity Parity Data Parity Data Data Data 
Value D1 ⊕ D2 ⊕ D4 D1 ⊕ D3 ⊕ D4 D1 D2 ⊕ D3 ⊕ D4 D2 D3 D4 
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recompute another bit, and 4 bits are used to validate each bit through two 
equations. 
Table 12 shows the computation table for the (15, 11) Hamming Code, where each 
parity bit is computed as the XOR of the data bits which are marked with an X. 
Table 12 – (15, 11) Hamming Code Computation Table 
Generally, a Hamming Code with m parity bits will allow for 2m – m – 1 data bits, and 
the total number of bits is 2m – 1. Valid Hamming Code arrangements include: (3, 1), 
(7, 4), (15, 11), (31, 26), (63, 57). Although the (3, 1) Hamming Code is technically a 
triple repetition code which has the characteristics of Simple Replication. For every 
extra parity bit, the total number of bits roughly doubles, and the number of bits 
involved in every parity bit calculation also roughly doubles. In fact, every parity bit 
involves 2(m – 1) – 1 data bits in its calculation. For any two parity bits, their equations 
will have 2(m – 2) bits overlapping, which is visually evident in Table 12. 
To use Hamming Code in the Framework, a file F can be split into K data pieces and 
then Hamming Code would be computed bitwise by taking a bit from each data piece 
one at a time. For example, to use the (7, 4) Hamming Code, we would split the file 
into 4 pieces. In each iteration, a bit from each of the four pieces, K1, K2, K3, and K4, 
is taken to compute 3 parity bits R1, R2, and R3 which are written into the 3 
redundancy file pieces in order. 
Bit position 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Encoded data bits 
 
p1 p2 d1 p4 d2 d3 d4 p8 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 



























   
X X X X 
    
X X X X 
p8 
       
X X X X X X X X 
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The encoding time is linear with respect to the file size, or simply O(|F|), since XOR is 
implemented in the CPU in hardware and the parity bits can be computed through a 
single pass read through all the data bits. To check for errors, every parity bit needs 
to be recomputed from their data bits and checked against the stored parity bit. If no 
errors are present in the set of file pieces, then decoding involves the proper 
sequential arrangement of all data bits. Hence, decoding operation for a set of file 
pieces that have no errors would be O(|F|). If errors exist, then two equations are 
necessary to recover and validate a bit, assuming all bits involved except the error bit 
is correct. The error bit must also be present in both equations, hence 2(m – 1) – 1 +  
2(m – 2) = 3 × 2(m – 2) – 1 bits are required to recover an error bit. In such scenarios, the 
computation necessary to recover 1 bit involves computing the bit through a single 
pass of reading through the bits of one equation, and then validating the bit through 
another equation. Decoding time is thus O(|F|) overall. 
Hamming Code has a file reconstruction threshold FT = K, a file piece reconstruction 
threshold PT = 2(m – 1) – 1, a resultant space of 2m – 1, a resultant space factor of (2m – 1) 
÷ (2m – m – 1), and a redundancy factor of m ÷ (2m – m – 1). 

















from any 2 
equations 
Bits needed to 
validate 
another bit RSF RF RSF/RF 
(3, 1) 2 3 1 1 2 1 3.0000 0.6667 4.5000 
(7, 4) 3 7 4 3 5 2 1.7500 0.4286 4.0833 
(15, 11) 4 15 11 7 11 4 1.3636 0.2667 5.1136 
(31, 26) 5 31 26 15 23 8 1.1923 0.1613 7.3923 
(63, 57) 6 63 57 31 47 16 1.1053 0.0952 11.6053 
(127, 120) 7 127 120 63 95 32 1.0583 0.0551 19.2012 
(255, 247) 8 255 247 127 191 64 1.0324 0.0314 32.9074 
(511, 502) 9 511 502 255 383 128 1.0179 0.0176 57.7957 
(1023, 1013) 10 1023 1013 511 767 256 1.0099 0.0098 103.3099 
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Table 13 shows the redundancy performance of some of the Hamming Codes. As we 
increase the number of parity bits used in the code, both RSF and RF approach 1 and 
0 respectively. 
It is not surprizing why the (7, 4) Hamming Code was the most popular among the 
set, as well as being the canonical code, as it achieves the best trade off of 
redundancy and resultant space without resorting to the simple replication of the (3, 
1) Hamming Code. Higher level Hamming Codes reduce the safety of the set of data 
as there are relatively fewer number of parity bits compared to data bits. The table 
confirms this as RF drops to nearly 0 for higher level Hamming Codes. 
The temporary memory space needed for encoding and decoding is m + k bits. 
Relative to files in MB or higher in size, we can safely claim that the memory space 
needed is negligible. If some data bit changes upon an edit, then its corresponding 
parity bits must be updated. Hamming Code supports partial updates since not every 
parity bit must change for a given data bit change. 
Hamming Code does not have either the confusion or diffusion properties, since 
attackers who gain sufficient numbers of bits necessary to construct another bit can 
then progressively work towards gaining the data of the entire system by 
reconstructing one bit at a time. As the data bits are written to the output pieces 
unchanged, an attacker can at times guess any missing bits using dictionary attacks. 
Lastly, Hamming Code does require the use of a reconstruction relation table in order 
to keep track of the file pieces and their corresponding bit position in the code table. 
It does not need a computation key however. 
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6.3.3 RAID-5 ALGORITHM 
Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) is a suite of stream or block based 
redundancy algorithms in addition to hard drive configurations, invented by Peter M. 
Chen, et al. in 1994 [49]. RAID is implemented in almost all modern computer 
systems as a disk-level data redundancy system, working behind the scenes to 
protect a users’ data. The series of RAID algorithms starting with RAID-1 was 
invented to provide redundancy for storage of data in disks. We are interested in the 
algorithms only, and in particular the RAID-5 single parity algorithm. 
RAID-5 stripes all data at the block level into K number of pieces (A, B, C, D, …, K), 
while maintaining identical sizes for each piece. It then computes one parity piece (R) 
with the size equal to one of the pieces, each bit within the parity piece is the result 
of the XORs of the corresponding bit from the split pieces. The equation to compute 
P is as follows: 









 ⊕ … ⊕ Ki, for i = 0 to |K|, given |K| in bits 
The parity piece affords at most one piece to fail among any of the pieces. The 
recovery of a missing piece is done with the same procedure; however, we compute 
the missing piece bit by bit by taking the XOR of all remaining pieces. For example if 
piece B was completely erased, we could recompute it as follows:  









 ⊕ … ⊕ Ki, i = 0 to |K|, given |K| in bits. 
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We can show that given a file of size |F| and the desired the number of piece K, RAID-
5 will produce a total output file size |N| = |F| + |F| ÷ K. This has a resultant space 
factor of (K + 1) ÷ K, and a redundancy factor of 1 ÷ (K + 1). RAID-5 requires that all 
pieces except 1 be present in order to reconstruct the missing or erroneous piece. Its 
file reconstruction threshold and file piece reconstruction threshold are both K. 
Implementing RAID-5 algorithm in software would require the memory space of  
(K + 1) × |K| bits. For encoding a file, the program will read K bits at a time and split 
them into the K memory blocks. Then the program computes the Parity block from 
these blocks, and writes all K + 1 blocks to the corresponding output files. The 
program continues until all bits from the file have been read. RAID-5 encodes a file in 
time O(|F|), using memory space of O(K + 1) bits. Reconstruction of the original file in 
RAID-5 simply requires reassembling the original file by reading the bits from all K 
file pieces in the correct order. RAID-5 decodes a file in time O(|F|) using memory 
space of O(K) bits. Like Hamming Code, RAID-5 uses relatively negligible memory 
space. 
Table 14 – RAID-5 Schemes and Redundancy Performances 
RAID-5 can correct errors in at most 1 block, through reconstruction of the block. A 
checksum must be computed for each block in order to use it as an indicator of 
RAID-5 (N, K) R N K RSF RF RSF/RF 
(2, 1) 1 2 1 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(3, 2) 1 3 2 1.5000 0.3333 4.5000 
(4, 3) 1 4 3 1.3333 0.2500 5.3333 
(5, 4) 1 5 4 1.2500 0.2000 6.2500 
(6, 5) 1 6 5 1.2000 0.1667 7.2000 
(7, 6) 1 7 6 1.1667 0.1429 8.1667 
(8, 7) 1 8 7 1.1429 0.1250 9.1429 
(9, 8) 1 9 8 1.1250 0.1111 10.1250 
(10, 9) 1 10 9 1.1111 0.1000 11.1111 
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whether the block has been modified. RAID-5 is similar to Hamming Code in that one 
single parity equation is used throughout the system.  
Table 14 shows a sample of RAID-5 schemes and their performances. The (3, 2) RAID-
5 scheme is the most popular as it gives the best ratio between RSF and RF without 
resorting to simple replication in the (2, 1) scheme. 
From a security point of view, RAID-5 does not achieve the properties of diffusion 
and confusion. Like Hamming Code, attackers can use the dictionary attack to break 
this code. RAID-5 supports partial updates as changes in any data bit require only a 
corresponding update to that parity bit. It does not require a computation key but 
does require a reconstruction table to identify the ordering of the original file pieces. 
6.3.4 LOW-DENSITY PARITY-CHECK CODES 
Low-Density Parity-Check Codes (LDPC) were invented by Robert G. Gallagher in 1960 
[50] as part of his doctoral dissertation, subsequently published in 1963. LDPC is 
similar to RAID-5 in that both use the XOR operation. In LDPC, given a file F split into 
K pieces, R additional redundancy pieces are computed, each by taking a subset of 
the K pieces and computing their XOR parity. A specific configuration of LDPC and 
example is as follows: 
Let the K pieces be K1, K2, K3 and K4, and the R redundancy pieces be R1, R2, R3, R4. 
Each of the blocks have size |F| ÷ K. Then: 
       ⊕    ⊕    
       ⊕    ⊕    
       ⊕    ⊕    
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       ⊕    ⊕    
Once computed, the equations can be rewritten in the form: 
      ⊕    ⊕    ⊕     
      ⊕    ⊕    ⊕     
      ⊕    ⊕    ⊕     
      ⊕    ⊕    ⊕     
In this set of equations, any 3 of 8 total pieces can be used to reconstruct 1 other 
piece just like the process in RAID-5. We also only need half the number of total 
pieces to reconstruct all pieces, such as by obtaining N1, N2, R1, and R2 which can 
then be used to compute N3 and N4. If no pieces were lost, we can optimally choose 
the pieces which cost less to download and reconstruct the pieces which are more 
expensive to download. These features make it better than RAID-5. 
A reconstruction relation table must be kept for LDPC in order to keep track of the 
relationship between each data piece and its corresponding redundancy pieces. 
However, assuming all pieces have no errors, the system could try all combinations 
of pieces until it finds the subsets which yield a chained XOR result of 0. One piece 
out of each chain must be a redundancy piece, as shown in the above equation sets, 
and could be logically deduced from examining the involvement of the other pieces 
in other equations. For an attacker, breaking the system this way is much more 
expensive than trying to obtain the metadata file containing the relation table. When 
K is chosen to be very large, trying all combinations becomes very costly. 
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For any LDPC configuration, the total time to encode the file into K data pieces and to 
compute the R redundancy pieces is O(|F|). The key value to choose in LDPC is the 
number of data pieces PT involved in the calculation of each redundancy piece R, 
where PT ≤ K. One might observe that LDPC follows the binomial theorem to choose 
and permute the data pieces used to compute each of the redundancy pieces. Thus, R 
can be computed as a function of PT and K as follows: 
Equation 10 – Binomial Coefficient Formula for LDPC Codes 




The threshold number of pieces to reconstruct the original file is FT = K.  It results in 
a space of |F| + |R| × R, with a redundancy factor of R ÷ N. The Resultant Space Factor 
is N ÷ K. Similar to RAID-5, we can formulate R by computing using PT bits of each of 
the K pieces at a time and then writing the output to the R files sequentially, so the 
temporary space required to encode is R × K × PT bits. It is relatively more than 
Hamming Code and RAID-5, but still negligible considering files in sizes of MB or 
higher. The total time to decode a file is O(|F|) with the fastest by simply reading and 
joining the K data pieces, and the slowest by reconstructing some of the K data 
pieces using the R redundancy pieces. The temporary space required for decoding is 
|F|. 
We know that (K choose PT) ≥ K, however the total number of redundancy pieces R 
does not necessarily have to match the total number of possible permutations. For 
example, let the K pieces be K1, K2, K3, and K4, and the redundancy pieces be R1, R2 
computed as follows: 
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       ⊕    ⊕    
       ⊕    ⊕    
To recover any piece, only three pieces are needed. However the relative risk and cost 
of losing each piece is not the same for systematic total reconstruction. For example, 
if K2 and K3 were lost at the same time then the system cannot possibly reconstruct 
either of them, however if K1 and K4 were lost at the same time the system could 
reconstruct both of them. In short, rather than only requiring any half of the number 
of pieces to reconstruct the file, this now requires some chosen subset. This lets the 
system choose different redundancy factors and have a different resultant space, 
while maintaining the same time complexity and roughly the same temporary space 
requirements. 
We will utilize all possible R combinations for performance analysis, as maintaining 
the property of letting any K number of pieces be used for reconstruction gives 
substantially higher flexibility in data placement in the Cloud. For these, the resultant 
space is ((K choose PT) + K) × |F| ÷ K. The resultant size factor is ((K choose PT) + K) ÷ 
K. The redundancy factor is ((K choose PT) + K) ÷ (K choose PT). 
Table 15 shows some possible configurations for LDPC, where PT is set with respect 
to K shown in the leftmost column. When PT = K, the system behaves the same as 
RAID-5. When PT = K – 1, the system constantly produces configurations which result 
in RSF of 2 and RF of 0.5; that is there is an equal number of redundancy file pieces 
as there are original file pieces. When K ÷ 2 ≤ PT ≤ K – 2, LDPC generates more 
redundancy pieces than the number of file pieces in the system but in a more 
controlled fashion than simple replication. 
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Table 15 – LDPC Configurations and Redundancy Performances 
Examining the three configurations with an equivalent performance through the 
RSF/RF ratio of 7.2, we can see the flexibility of LDPC. To achieve this, LDPC could 
split the file into 5 pieces and compute 1 redundancy piece, shown in the (6, 5, 5) 
configuration. It could also split the file into 11 pieces and compute 55 redundancy 
pieces using 9 pieces at  a time, as shown in the (66, 11, 9) configuration. Lastly, it 
 






(2, 1, 1) 1 1 2 1 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(3, 2, 2) 2 1 3 2 1.5000 0.3333 4.5000 
(4, 3, 3) 3 1 4 3 1.3333 0.2500 5.3333 
(5, 4, 4) 4 1 5 4 1.2500 0.2000 6.2500 
(6, 5, 5) 5 1 6 5 1.2000 0.1667 7.2000 
(7, 6, 6) 6 1 7 6 1.1667 0.1429 8.1667 
(8, 7, 7) 7 1 8 7 1.1429 0.1250 9.1429 
(9, 8, 8) 8 1 9 8 1.1250 0.1111 10.1250 








(4, 2, 1) 1 2 4 2 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(6, 3, 2) 2 3 6 3 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(8, 4, 3) 3 4 8 4 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 5, 4) 4 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(12, 6, 5) 5 6 12 6 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(14, 7, 6) 6 7 14 7 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(16, 8, 7) 7 8 16 8 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(18, 9, 8) 8 9 18 9 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 








(6, 3, 1) 1 3 6 3 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 4, 2) 2 6 10 4 2.5000 0.6000 4.1667 
(15, 5, 3) 3 10 15 5 3.0000 0.6667 4.5000 
(21, 6, 4) 4 15 21 6 3.5000 0.7143 4.9000 
(28, 7, 5) 5 21 28 7 4.0000 0.7500 5.3333 
(36, 8, 6) 6 28 36 8 4.5000 0.7778 5.7857 
(45, 9, 7) 7 36 45 9 5.0000 0.8000 6.2500 
(55, 10, 8) 8 45 55 10 5.5000 0.8182 6.7222 








(8, 4, 1) 1 4 8 4 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(15, 5, 2) 2 10 15 5 3.0000 0.6667 4.5000 
(26, 6, 3) 3 20 26 6 4.3333 0.7692 5.6333 
(42, 7, 4) 4 35 42 7 6.0000 0.8333 7.2000 
(64, 8, 5) 5 56 64 8 8.0000 0.8750 9.1429 
(93, 9, 6) 6 84 93 9 10.3333 0.9032 11.4405 
(130, 10, 7) 7 120 130 10 13.0000 0.9231 14.0833 
(176, 11, 8) 8 165 176 11 16.0000 0.9375 17.0667 
(232, 12, 9) 9 220 232 12 19.3333 0.9483 20.3879 
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could split the file into 7 pieces and compute 35 redundancy pieces using 4 pieces at 
a time, as shown in the (42, 7, 4) configuration.  
Like RAID-5, the system must download all but 1 piece to recover the file in the (6, 5, 
5) configuration, however the other two configurations offer substantially higher 
flexibility. In (66, 11, 9) configuration, the least amount of pieces it needs to 
download is 11 out of 66 total pieces. In (42, 7, 4) configuration, the least amount of 
pieces required is 7 out of 42. In the latter two configurations, the absolute cost is 
higher as the total file size is 6 times the original, but it grants this flexibility during 
any recovery operation. Shown through their RF values of 0.8333, they both are more 
secure than the (6, 5, 5) configuration which has an RF of 0.1667. 
From a security point of view, LDPC achieves diffusion but not confusion as given a 
sufficient subset of K pieces, the remaining pieces could be guessed using the 
dictionary attack. Partial updates are supported by LDPC as only the bits in the file 
pieces corresponding to the modified bits in the original file need to be recomputed. 
6.3.5 SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING ALGORITHM 
Adi Shamir introduced a secret sharing scheme and algorithm in 1979 in his 
publication “How to share a secret” in Communications of the ACM [51]. The scheme 
is a threshold scheme, and is most widely used to split a master encryption key into 
shares whereby any subset of shares meeting the minimum threshold can be used to 
reconstruct the master key. 
The principle behind the algorithm is that for any polynomial of degree K – 1 
requires K points to define. We choose one particular point of a degree K – 1 equation 
to be the secret point where it’s Y value is the binary numeric value of the data, and 
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we randomly choose N other points (N > K) from the polynomial as shares to be 
stored. The secret can only be computed when the polynomial can be reconstructed, 
which requires obtaining at least K out of N points to be used in curve fitting for 
reconstructing the equation. The Y values of the N points share the same range as the 
Y value of the secret, and in binary means they have the same number of bits. As 
such, each share has the same file size as the original file. 
Given a file size of |F|, Shamir’s Secret Sharing algorithm will produce a total output 
file size of N × (|F| + C) where C is a very small constant amount of data related to 
each share. This has a redundancy factor of (N – K) ÷ N. Relative to the size of the file 
however, the resultant space factor is N ÷ 1 = N since every point has the same size 
as the secret point. 
Given an input file F, it is divided in to a sequence of fixed sized m-bit pieces. 
Starting with the first piece, the binary value of the piece is taken as integer number 
y and assigned as the secret point of that piece, typically (X = 0, Y = y). y has a range 
of [0, 2m). N points are chosen by picking at random their X values, as long as it does 
not equal the X value of the secret point. These X values are used for all pieces. Their 
Y values are calculated per piece. Each resultant piece would contain one single X 
coordinate, and a list of Y coordinates each corresponding to a K – 1 degree equation. 
Figure 6 shows an example of an equation of degree 3, with 13 gray points defined 
on the curve. The black point at X = 0 is the secret. 
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Figure 6 – A Polynomial Equation of Degree 3 with 13 Points Defined 
For each equation, K – 1 random integers are chosen to form a K – 1 degree equation, 
whereby the constant term in the equation is calculated by putting the secret point 
into the equation and solving for Y. For example, let’s create a degree 2 polynomial: 
     
        
Let the secret be the number 25, and we assign it to the point (X = 3, Y = 25). By 
random we select two integers 3 and 9 for the constants, so the equation looks like 
the following after we substitute in the two integers: 
           
To solve for C, we put the secret point into the equation: 
              
           






-11 -6 -1 4
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The finalized equation is: 
            
The N points of the block are obtained by randomly choosing N distinct X 
coordinates and calculating their corresponding Y values using the equation. The N 
points are written to their corresponding output files. Continuing the example, let us 
suppose we chose 4 coordinate points of -4, -3, 0, and 2:  
         
                
         
                
      
             
      
           
Thus the redundancy data points are (–4, –17), (–3, –29), (0, –29), and (2, 1). The 
equation, secret point, and redundancy points are plotted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 – Shamir’s Secret Sharing Example 
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Once all pieces are processed, the X values of the N points and the secret point, as 
well as the piece size m, are written to the metadata file. This file forms the Key 
(analogous to encryption Key) for recovering the file. Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
algorithm encodes a file in time O(|F|), although slower than RAID-5, and uses 
memory space of O(N × m) bits. 
Given any K shares, the reconstruction process begins by reading into program 
memory the X value and piece size m from the Key file. The equation is recovered by 
computing for the secret equation F(x) piece by piece from the K share files. For each 




Equation 11 – LaGrange Basis Polynomials Equation 
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Then the equation is computed as: 
      ∑        
 
   
 
The secret point is then calculated from the equation. Each basis polynomial has K 
numerator and denominator terms. The equation is the sum of the K basis 
polynomials times the y value of the N points. Thus, Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
algorithm reconstructs a file in time O((K × |F|)2) and uses memory space of  
O((K × m)2) bits. 
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If up to R = N – K shares are corrupted or destroyed, they can still be recomputed by 
utilizing the K shares to formulate the equation, then picking at random R other X 
values. Shamir’s Secret Sharing algorithm requires K valid shares to repair any 
corrupted shares, and like RAID-5 will need to compute checksums for each share in 
order to ascertain whether the share has been modified. 
Table 16 – Shamir’s Secret Sharing Schemes and Redundancy Performance 
To use Shamir’s Secret Sharing, a polynomial degree must be chosen for the equation, 
as well as the desired number of redundant points on the equation. Table 16 shows 
various configurations of Shamir’s Secret Sharing. Shamir’s Secret Sharing seems to 
be most efficient when the total number of points N is double of the number of 
points K needed to reconstruct each equation of degree K – 1. Examples include (4, 2, 
1), (6, 3, 2), and (8, 4, 3) configurations. Overall, using lower polynomial degree 
Shamir's  
(N, K, PD) 
Polynomial 
Degree (PD) 
Points to define 
Equation (K) 
Redundant 
Equation Points (R) 
Total 
Points (N) 
RSF RF RSF/RF 
(2, 2, 1) 
1 2 
0 2 2.0000 0.0000 Undefined 
(3, 2, 1) 1 3 3.0000 0.3333 9.0000 
(4, 2, 1) 2 4 4.0000 0.5000 8.0000 
(5, 2, 1) 3 5 5.0000 0.6000 8.3333 
(6, 2, 1) 4 6 6.0000 0.6667 9.0000 
(7, 2, 1) 5 7 7.0000 0.7143 9.8000 
(8, 2, 1) 6 8 8.0000 0.7500 10.6667 
(3, 3, 2) 
2 3 
0 3 3.0000 0.0000 Undefined 
(4, 3, 2) 1 4 4.0000 0.2500 16.0000 
(5, 3, 2) 2 5 5.0000 0.4000 12.5000 
(6, 3, 2) 3 6 6.0000 0.5000 12.0000 
(7, 3, 2) 4 7 7.0000 0.5714 12.2500 
(8, 3, 2) 5 8 8.0000 0.6250 12.8000 
(9, 3, 2) 6 9 9.0000 0.6667 13.5000 
(4, 4, 3) 
3 4 
0 4 4.0000 0.0000 Undefined 
(5, 4, 3) 1 5 5.0000 0.2000 25.0000 
(6, 4, 3) 2 6 6.0000 0.3333 18.0000 
(7, 4, 3) 3 7 7.0000 0.4286 16.3333 
(8, 4, 3) 4 8 8.0000 0.5000 16.0000 
(9, 4, 3) 5 9 9.0000 0.5556 16.2000 
(10, 4, 3) 6 10 10.0000 0.6000 16.6667 
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equations result in a more efficient system. We can see that with an RSF of 8, using a 
polynomial degree 1 equation gives us a redundancy factor of 0.75 while it gives a 
redundancy factor of 0.625 and 0.5 using polynomial degree 2 and 3 equations, 
respectively. 
From a security point of view, Shamir’s Secret Scheme algorithm achieves both the 
properties of Confusion and Diffusion. The original text is transformed into a set of 
N file pieces which is tied by a mathematical relationship that can only be reverse 
engineered if the Key file was decrypted, and if K out of N file pieces were obtained. 
An attacker which obtains a number of files less than K cannot guess the contents in 
the remaining files since they cannot reconstruct the equation. 
Overall Shamir’s Secret Scheme has a higher space cost than the previous studies 
erasure codes. Its mathematical technique must represent and bound each secret 
point’s data value to a range in order to control the resulting binary file size. Since 
every point on the equation shares this bounded range, the more points needed the 
higher the cost in terms of resultant file space. It is however much more secure, since 
it is immune to dictionary attacks. 
6.3.6 RABIN’S INFORMATION DISPERSAL ALGORITHM 
Michael Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) was brought to the world in 
his paper published in the Journal of ACM in 1989 [52]. It is also an erasure code, and 
is based on a matrix multiplication and inversion process.  
IDA considers a file to have L symbols. IDA first splits the L symbols into   ⌈   ⌉ 
input fragments, where K is the number of symbols per fragment. Each fragment has 
size |F| ÷ M in bits. If L is not a multiple of K, then IDA pads the message with zeroes 
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to generate extra symbols. Let us denote these input fragments as F
i
. Thus, the file 
will be split into fragments              ⌈   ⌉    [58]. 
IDA uses an N × K encoding matrix, denoted as A, where any K rows of the matrix are 
linearly independent. One type of matrix which satisfies this requirement is a 
Vandermonde matrix, where for row i the values of the matrix are: 
1, (i + 1), (i + 1)2, (i + 1)3 … (i + 1)K−1 
To encode, IDA takes each input fragment F
i
 one at a time and multiplies it to matrix 
A to form the output fragments. Then, the fragments are organized column wise into 
an output matrix. Each row of this matrix forms an output file piece. IDA outputs N 
file pieces, each piece having M symbols. Any K of N file pieces can be used to 
recover the original message. 
For example, let there be a message have 10 integers (1, 3, 5, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11) and 
we want to split it into 4 fragments. In this case, L = 10 and K = 3. Since L is not an 
integer multiple of K, we pad the message with zeroes. M = ⌈   ⌉    for this 
example. In order they are (1, 3, 5), (2, 4, 6), (7, 8, 9), and (11, 0, 0) respectively. 
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The output fragments are computed by taking each input fragment and multiply it 
with matrix A: 














   
   
   





















   
   
   
   





















   
   
   
   
   


































Treating each fragment as a column, we join the fragments together to form the  










       
        
         
          
           
           
           









Each output file piece is a row of the output matrix, for this example it is (9, 12, 24, 
11), (27, 34, 59, 11) … (345, 418, 647, 11). To reconstruct the original message, any K 
file pieces will suffice, for example taking the 3 pieces (9, 12, 24, 11), (55, 68, 112, 
11), and (93, 114, 183, 11) which corresponds to rows 1, 3, and 4 of the output 
matrix. 
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We construct the K × K decoding matrix by copying the rows from the encoding 
matrix A that correspond to each file piece: 
  [ 
   
   
    
] 
We compute the inverse matrix of B: 




      
     
    
] 
Also, we arrange the output pieces row wise corresponding to the decoding matrix: 
[ 
       
         
          
] 
Taking each column in order from left to right and multiplying it to the inverse 





]      [   ]    [ 
  
  
   
]      [   ] 
[ 
  
   
   




]      [    ] 
The time it takes to encode a file is O(|F|2) due to the matrix multiplication operation, 
while the time to decode a file is O(|F|3 + |F|2) due to the matrix inversion operation on 
B, and the subsequent multiplication operation. The matrix A is the Key for IDA and 
must be stored in the metadata file. The matrix can have a size of a fraction of |F| 
since they are just numeric coefficients. The temporary memory space required for 
encoding the file is around O(|F|) since we must store the matrix in the memory but 
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can read the file and write out its encoding to the output file one piece at a time. 
Each piece has M symbols and each symbol is |F| ÷ L bits long, so the temporary 
memory space needed for encoding the file is O(|F| + |F| × M ÷ L) bits. The temporary 
memory space required to decode the file is also O(|F| + |F| × M ÷ L), where O(|F|) space 
is used to store the inverse matrix, and |F| × M ÷ L bits is used as input and output 
file buffers. The set of output files has a total space of N × M × |F| ÷ L bits. However 
an additional O(|F|) space must be used to store the metadata. The resultant size 
factor is N × M ÷ L. The redundancy factor is (N – K) ÷ N. 
Table 17 – Rabin’s IDA Configurations and Redundancy Performance 
Using Rabin’s IDA requires the number of symbols per file (L), the number of symbols 
per Fragment (K), and the number of resultant file pieces (N) to be given. Table 17 
 
Rabin's IDA  
(N, K, L, M) 
Symbols 
/ File (L) 
Fragments 
(M) 
Extra Symbols  













(10, 2, 10, 5) 10 5 0 8 10 2 5.0000 0.8000 6.2500 
(10, 3, 10, 4) 10 4 2 7 10 3 4.0000 0.7000 5.7143 
(10, 4, 10, 3) 10 3 2 6 10 4 3.0000 0.6000 5.0000 
(10, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 6, 10, 2) 10 2 2 4 10 6 2.0000 0.4000 5.0000 
(10, 7, 10, 2) 10 2 4 3 10 7 2.0000 0.3000 6.6667 
(10, 8, 10, 2) 10 2 6 2 10 8 2.0000 0.2000 10.0000 









(6, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 1 6 5 1.2000 0.1667 7.2000 
(7, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 2 7 5 1.4000 0.2857 4.9000 
(8, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 3 8 5 1.6000 0.3750 4.2667 
(9, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 4 9 5 1.8000 0.4444 4.0500 
(10, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(11, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 6 11 5 2.2000 0.5455 4.0333 
(12, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 7 12 5 2.4000 0.5833 4.1143 
(13, 5, 10, 2) 10 2 0 8 13 5 2.6000 0.6154 4.2250 







L (10, 5, 100, 20) 100 20 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 5, 200, 40) 200 40 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 5, 300, 60) 300 60 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 5, 400, 80) 400 80 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
(10, 5, 500, 100) 500 100 0 5 10 5 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Ex (8, 3, 10, 4) 10 4 2 5 8 3 3.2000 0.6250 5.1200 
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shows that IDA can provide a wide range of security and cost optimized 
configurations. For a high security configuration a user might use the (10, 2, 10, 5) 
configuration which has a redundancy factor of 0.8. For a space efficient 
configuration, a user might use the (6, 5, 10, 2) configuration which has a resultant 
size factor of 1.2. For a balanced configuration, a user can use any configuration 
where N = 2 × K, such as (10, 5, 10, 2) where its RSF/RF ratio is 4.0, the lowest for 
Rabin’s IDA. 
From a security point of view, Rabin’s IDA achieves both confusion and diffusion as 
the matrix multiplication operation masks the original data, and spreads the effects 
of the bits to all N pieces of resultant files. An update to the original file will require 
the all symbols and file pieces to be recomputed and updated. As such, IDA does not 
support partial updates. 
6.3.7 REED-SOLOMON CODES 
In 1960, Irving S. Reed and G. Solomon published “Polynomial Codes over Certain 
Finite Fields” describing a family of efficient, max distance separable error correction 
codes based upon polynomial construction and deconstruction [53] over a Finite 
Field. The family of codes is named Reed-Solomon (RS) codes after their inventors.  
An (N, K) RS code exists over a Finite Field of GF(2M) where N = 2M – 1. M is chosen to 
correspond with common bit-lengths such as Word (4), Byte (8), and 16, 32, and 64 
for corresponding CPU architectures. For network applications, the traditional home 
field for RS codes, M is typically 8. For GF(16), M = 4. In all codes, K is chosen 
depending on the level of redundancy the designer wants in the code. When N – K is 
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even, then 2t = N – K, if it is odd, then 2t = N – K – 1. Simplifying these equations, 
    ⌊   –     ⌋.  
An (N, K) RS code can self-repair up to t errors, or 2t erasures. RS codes can detect up 
to t error locations and correct them through its standard decoding process, however 
if the error locations are known ahead of time, then it can correct up to 2t errors 
directly. 
An (N, K) RS code is constructed by forming the generator polynomial G(X) consisting 
of N – K factors, the roots of the polynomial are consecutive elements in the Finite 
Field, as shown in Equation 12. Some codes start with b = 0, while others start with  
b = 1. 
Equation 12 – Reed-Solomon Codes Generator Polynomial 
G(X) = (X + αb)(X + αb+1)…(X + αb+2t-1) 
For example, the Generator Polynomial for the (15, 11) RS code with B = 0 is 
calculated as follows: 
2t = 15 – 11 = 4, thus four factors in G(X). 
2t – 1 = 3 
G(X) = (X + α0)(X + α1)(X + α2)(X + α3) 
Since, α = 2 
G(X) = (X + 1)(X + 2)(X + 4)(X + 8) = X4 + 15X3 + 3X2 + X + 12 
Substituting the coefficients with the field element values from Table 2, we get 
Equation 13 which is the generator polynomial for the (15, 11) RS code. 
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Equation 13 – Generator Polynomial for (15, 11) Reed-Solomon Code 
G(X) = α0X4 + α12X3 + α4X2 + α0X + α6 
The encoding procedure for RS codes starts by dividing the file into a number of 
messages M
i
(X). Each message, denoted as M(X) for simplicity, is further divided into 
K information symbols each M bits long. 
M(X) = M
K-1











 is an M-bit message symbol corresponding to an 
element of GF(2M). 
To form the encoded code word, multiple each message M(X) by XN-K, then divide by 
G(X): 
Equation 14 – Reed-Solomon Encoding Computation 
         
    
      
    
    
 
Division by G(X) produces quotient Q(X) and remainder R(X) polynomials, where R(X) 
is of degree up to N – K – 1. 
The encoded code word T(X) is formed as the message bits joined with the remainder 
bits, shown in Figure 8. Computation they can be computed by shifting M(X) by XN-K 
bits then adding R(X), as follows: 
                    
      
         
           
           
Chapter 6: Cloud Storage Framework 
109 
 
Figure 8 – Encoded Code Word for Reed-Solomon Codes 
Rewriting Equation 14, we have the following identities: 
                         
                              
As such, T(X) is always divisible by G(X) without remainder. This is the condition 
checked by a system using RS coding to ensure a code word has no errors. 
Consider the received code word as R(X) = T(X) + E(X), where E(X) represents any 
received errors. The error correction process follows a 5 step procedure [59]: 
Table 18 – Reed Solomon Error Correction Process 
To use RS codes in erasure correction mode, a checksum would have to be computed 
for every symbol, and then checked prior to the decoding process. The decoding 
process in this case first flags the symbols and locations which do not have a 
matching checksum, and then uses Forney’s Formula in step 4 to compute the error 
magnitudes in order to reconstruct T(X). 
Step Process Runtime 
1 Calculate and find all Error Syndromes. Up to t syndromes can be found. O(|F|) 




Use Chien Search to find all the error locations. Specifically, find the roots of the error location 
polynomials L(X) over the GF field, which gives us the error locations. 
O(|F|) 
4 Use Forney’s Formula to compute the error magnitudes at each error location, giving us E(X) O(|F|) 
5 Solve for T(X):  T(X) = R(X) – E(X) O(|F|) 
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In both error correction mode and erasure correction mode, M(X) is extracted from 
T(X) after checking that T(X) is correct. Extrapolating towards an entire file, the 
sequence of messages M
i
(X), once extracted individually from each RS encoded code 
word, would be combined in the correct sequence to reconstruct the original file. To 
store the code words on the Cloud, each symbol within a code word is grouped with 
the corresponding symbols sharing the same position in other code words, then it is 
sequenced in the same order as the set of messages M
i
(X), forming the output files 
pieces. 
Out of N total symbols of each code word, K of them are information symbols, and N 
– K of them are redundancy symbols. This gives a resultant space of N × |F| ÷ K, 
resultant space factor of N ÷ K. RS codes gives a redundancy factor of t ÷ N if used in 
error correction mode, and alternatively it gives a redundancy factor of  
2t ÷ N = (N – K) ÷ N if used in erasure correction mode. A computation key must be 
kept to store the Finite Field elements and their values. A reconstruction relation 
table must also be kept in the metadata to store the index and sequence of messages 
in relation to the original file. 
Table 19 shows the redundancy performance of various RS codes for M = 2, 4, and 8. 
Using the code in erasure correction mode would yield double the redundancy factor 
compared to using the code in error correction mode. The resultant size of each code 
word is the same, although in erasure correction mode some extra data must be kept 
in the metadata file for the checksums. Overall the performance favors using RS 
codes in erasure correction mode. RS codes are the safest when K is minimal; this is 
evident regardless of what value of M is chosen. Whenever K = 1, the highest possible 
redundancy factor is achieved. However, space wise the most efficient codes exist 
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when   ⌊   ⌋, or half the number of symbols. These are the bolded rows in Table 
19, which includes the (3, 1), (15, 7), and (255, 127) RS codes. 
Table 19 – Reed-Solomon Codes and Redundancy Performances 
Interestingly, the most popular RS codes in use – the (255, 223), (255, 239), and (255, 
251) codes, shown at the bottom in Table 19 – do not provide much redundancy nor 
is it very efficient at providing its respective level of redundancy. These codes are 
used in modern day satellite communications, optical disk storage encoding, and 
many other communications tasks. 
  





Reed-Solomon Code (N, K) M GF N K R T RSF RF RSF/RF RF RSF/RF 
(15, 2) 
4 16 15 
2 13 6 7.5000 0.4000 18.7500 0.8000 9.3750 
(15, 3) 3 12 6 5.0000 0.4000 12.5000 0.8000 6.2500 
(15, 5) 5 10 5 3.0000 0.3333 9.0000 0.6667 4.5000 
(15, 7) 7 8 4 2.1429 0.2667 8.0357 0.5333 4.0179 
(15, 9) 9 6 3 1.6667 0.2000 8.3333 0.4000 4.1667 
(15, 11) 11 4 2 1.3636 0.1333 10.2273 0.2667 5.1136 
(15, 13) 13 2 1 1.1538 0.0667 17.3077 0.1333 8.6538 
(255, 10) 
8 256 255 
10 245 122 25.5000 0.4784 53.2992 0.9569 26.6496 
(255, 20) 20 235 117 12.7500 0.4588 27.7885 0.9176 13.8942 
(255, 40) 40 215 107 6.3750 0.4196 15.1928 0.8392 7.5964 
(255, 60) 60 195 97 4.2500 0.3804 11.1727 0.7608 5.5863 
(255, 80) 80 175 87 3.1875 0.3412 9.3427 0.6824 4.6713 
(255, 100) 100 155 77 2.5500 0.3020 8.4448 0.6039 4.2224 
(255, 120) 120 135 67 2.1250 0.2627 8.0877 0.5255 4.0438 
(255, 127) 127 128 64 2.0079 0.2510 8.0001 0.5020 4.0001 
(255, 140) 140 115 57 1.8214 0.2235 8.1485 0.4471 4.0742 
(255, 160) 160 95 47 1.5938 0.1843 8.6469 0.3686 4.3235 
(255, 180) 180 75 37 1.4167 0.1451 9.7635 0.2902 4.8818 
(255, 200) 200 55 27 1.2750 0.1059 12.0417 0.2118 6.0208 
(255, 220) 220 35 17 1.1591 0.0667 17.3864 0.1333 8.6932 
(255, 240) 240 15 7 1.0625 0.0275 38.7054 0.0549 19.3527 
(255, 255) 255 0 0 1.0000 0.0000 Undefined 0.0000 Undefined 
(255, 223) 8 256 255 223 32 16 1.1435 0.0627 18.2245 0.1255 9.1122 
(255, 239) 8 256 255 239 16 8 1.0669 0.0314 34.0089 0.0627 17.0044 
(255, 251) 8 256 255 251 4 2 1.0159 0.0078 129.5319 0.0157 64.7659 
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6.3.8 OVERALL COMPARISON 
All seven erasure codes are compared in this section for their redundancy 
performance, security properties, and algorithmic efficiencies in this section. 
Table 20 – Best Redundancy Performance Erasure Code Configurations 
Table 20 shows the configurations of each erasure code at their best redundancy 
performance. A code achieves its best redundancy performance when the ratio of 
RSF/RF is at its lowest. The ratio is essentially the cost divided by the gain; namely, 
the resultant space taken by the set of files after encoding divided by the safety 
afforded by the set of files represented by the factor of files pieces that could be 
completely lost. When this ratio is minimized, we achieve the best trade-off of space 
cost vs file safety gained. For all codes, it seems that their best performance is 
achieved when N = 2 × K. This implies that configurations should produce the same 
number of redundancy file pieces as there are original file pieces. 
It is not easy to find a single configuration that works for all codes, except for the 
most trivial of (2, 1) for which in all codes except Rabin’s IDA they would carbon 
copy the original file once. To compare the codes’ performances when set to a 











(2, 1)  2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Hamming Code (7, 4)  1.7500 0.4286 4.0833 
RAID-5 (3, 2)  1.5000 0.3333 4.5000 
LDPC 
Any (N, K, PT) code  
where N = 2 × K 
(6, 3, 2) 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Shamir's Secret 
Sharing 
(4, 2, 1)  4.0000 0.5000 8.0000 
Rabin's IDA 
Any (N, K, L, M) code  
where N = 2 × K 
(10, 5, 10, 2) 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Reed-Solomon 
Any (N, K) code where N = 2 × K - 
1, large N improves minorly 
(225, 127) 2.0079 0.5020 4.0001 
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meaningful equivalent configuration, we attempted to configure each code as close as 
possible to a (15, 11) configuration. The emphasis is on the 11 original file pieces, as 
the total number of pieces is the result of each code’s encoding process. The results 
are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21 – Redundancy Performances When Set As Close to (15, 11) Code Configuration 
For Simple Replication, K is always 1 so the configuration was set to (15, 1). For RAID-
5, K is always N – 1 so the configuration was set to (12, 11). For LDPC, since N is a 
result of the chosen PT and K values, the configuration was set to (22, 11, 10). The 
other four codes were able to configure for (15, 11) directly. 
The most restrictive codes in terms of configuration flexibility are Simple Replication, 
Hamming Code, and RAID-5. The least restrictive codes are Shamir’s Secret Sharing, 
Reed-Solomon, and Rabin’s IDA. LDPC is in the middle in terms of flexibility. 
Except for Shamir’s Secret Sharing and Rabin’s IDA, the configurations in Table 21 
are the most efficient, or otherwise the only configurations, possible for each of the 
codes for this target. For these two codes, their most efficient configurations of (22, 
11) are also shown in the table. 
 
Configuration Code Properties R N K RSF RF RSF/RF 
Simple 
Replication 
(15, 1) K is always 1 14 15 1 15.0000 0.9333 16.0714 
Hamming Code (15, 11) 
Bits to Recover 1 Other Bit = 7 
Bit Overlap From any 2 Equations = 11 
Bits Needed to Validate Another Bit = 4 
4 15 11 1.3636 0.2667 5.1136 
RAID-5 (12, 11) K is always N – 1 1 12 11 1.0909 0.0833 13.0909 
LDPC (22, 11, 10) PT = 10 11 22 11 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Shamir's Secret 
Sharing 
(15, 11, 10) 
Poly Degree = 10 
4 15 11 15.0000 0.2667 56.2500 
(22, 11, 10) 11 22 11 22.0000 0.5000 44.0000 
Rabin's IDA 
(15, 11, 22, 2) Symbols Per File = 22, Fragments = 2,  
Extra Symbols = 0 
4 15 11 1.3636 0.2667 5.1136 
(22, 11, 22, 2) 11 22 11 2.0000 0.5000 4.0000 
Reed- Solomon (15, 11) M = 4, GF = 16, T = 2 4 15 11 1.3636 0.2667 5.1136 
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Table 21 shows that the two most efficient codes are LDPC and Rabin’s IDA. Both of 
these codes achieve RSF of 2.0, RF of 0.5, and RSF/RF of 4.0 in their most efficient 
configurations of (22, 11, 10) and (22, 11, 22, 2) respectively. Rabin’s IDA can also be 
configured with lower redundancy to save some disk space in the (15, 11, 22, 2) 
configuration. It can also be configured with higher redundancy if more security is 
desired. Its flexibility makes it the best performing code among the seven studied.  
Reed-Solomon codes are slightly more restrictive in terms of the number of possible 
configurations compared to Rabin’s IDA, however its performance closely matches 
IDA and in its theoretical upper bound it can also achieve the same performance as 
Rabin’s IDA. However, Reed-Solomon does not have the Confusion Property so it is 
less secure on its own compared to Rabin’s IDA. 
The worst performing code is Shamir’s Secret Sharing which does not seem to 
perform better than Simple Replication in these configurations. If Shamir’s is 
configured in (15, 11, 10) it has the same resultant space factor as Simple 
Replication, however it yields lower redundancy factor of 0.2667 compared to Simple 
Replication’s 0.5, which implies that it can tolerate less errors and file losses. If 
Shamir’s was configured to match the redundancy factor of 0.5, it yields a resultant 
space factor of 22.0 compared to Simple Replication’s 15.0, which implies it costs 
more space to provide the same level of redundancy. 
Table 22 shows that of the codes studied only Shamir’s Secret Sharing and Rabin’s 
IDA have the Confusion Property. Both of them involve a more costly decoding 
processes requiring at minimum O(|F|2) time complexity for decoding time. Between 
these two, Rabin’s IDA can achieve a lower resultant space factor, thus is more 
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efficient as it consumes less space to provide a similar level of redundancy as 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing. The trade-off is that Rabin’s IDA requires more memory 
space than Shamir’s Secret Sharing during both encoding and decoding operations. 






































1     –   K 
 
 
     –  K K   ⌊









                  | |
 
   | | 
    | |
 
 






    
      
 
   
 
 
               
 
 N 












      
 
 
   
 
               
             
 
   
 
 






Encoding Time O(|F|) O(|F|) O(|F|) O(|F|) O(|F|) O(|F|2) O(|F|) 




0 ~ 0 ~ 0                 (| |  






0 ~ 0 ~ 0 |F| O((K × M)2)  (| |  
| |   
 
) O(2 |N|) 
Confusion 
Property 
No No No No Yes Yes No 
Diffusion 
Property 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partial Updates 
Supported 









No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes 
 
M = number 
of parity bits 
= (N – K) 
  
M = number 
of parity bits 
L = symbols per 
file; M = number 
of fragments 
 
Chapter 6: Cloud Storage Framework 
116 
Another interesting observation is that only the XOR based codes support partial 
updates. This is useful to users since it can be expected that they would use a Cloud 
storage system to incrementally backup daily or weekly changes to files. Not having 
to re-upload all file pieces makes the system efficient and can save costs. 
The factors of Encoding Time, Decoding Time, Temporary Space for Encoding, 
Temporary Space for Decoding, Requirements for Metadata, and ability to support 
Partial Updates are useful for systems designers who are designing a redundant 
Cloud or distributed storage system. The security properties of Diffusion and 
Confusion are useful indicators of the algorithms’ ability to combat targeted attacks 
which attempt to gain the information contained in the files. The Resultant Space 
Factor and Redundancy Factor are of utmost interest in this thesis as it directly 
affects the file security, resiliency, and economic costs of a system given particular 
choices of algorithms. From a practical perspective, a code having Confusion and 
Diffusion Properties are cryptographically stronger, as they have an equivalent 
capability of essentially performing encryption on the contents of the file in addition 
to their ability to split the file and add redundancy. For the other codes studied, one 
means for them to “gain” the Confusion and Diffusion Properties is to encrypt the 
file using well known encryption algorithms before, or after using the code to split 
the encrypted file into pieces.  
Applying encryption before splitting is arguably stronger since it can be done at an 
operating system level with many choices of tools and algorithms, and it also 
safeguards the user’s data against other conventional attacks directly on their 
devices. The storage system should still be in charge of ensuring that a file has been 
encrypted prior to any encoding operations. Since diffusion implies that every input 
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bit is involved in computing an encrypted output bit, any updates to the original file 
would result in a completely different encrypted file. The storage system would have 
to re-encode the new encrypted file and produce a new set of file pieces, regardless 
of the erasure code algorithm used. Applying encryption before splitting results in a 
system that cannot support partial updates; a crucial computation, network 
bandwidth, and cost saving system property. Despite this shortcoming, this approach 
has been applied in prior work by Hugo Krawczyk of IBM, published in his paper 
“Secret Sharing Made Short” in 1993 [60]. 
Applying encryption after splitting makes the file pieces strong and resilient towards 
attacks. In this mode, each file piece is encrypted separately after the encoding 
operation. The storage system would be in charge of encrypting and decrypting each 
file piece, which could be implemented by operating system level functions or 
external encryption software. Applying encryption after splitting preserves the 
partial update properties of the relevant erasure codes. However, each output file 
piece will have to be re-encrypted in its entirety. In both cases, it will add to the total 
encoding and decoding time. 
All stream-based and block-based encryption algorithms, such as AES, DES, Blowfish, 
RC5, and IDEA have a linear time complexity relative to the size of the input file. 
However they need to be used in a proper mode of operation, such as Cipher Block 
Chaining, or Electronic Code Book modes to ensure the cryptographic security of the 
files. Other types of encryption algorithms exist with varied time complexities. 
In conclusion, one of two types of system design is recommended from this 
Framework. In the first, the system should use a fast linear-time erasure code with 
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support for partial updates, and pair it with a suitable encryption algorithm where 
encryption is applied after the encoding step. From the codes studied, LDPC would be 
most suitable due to its configuration flexibility. This design allows for strong file 
crypto security from the encryption process, and strong resiliency against storage 
provider mistakes due to the erasure coding, and high cost efficiencies from its 
ability to support partial updates. In the second design, the system should use an 
erasure code which has both the Confusion and Diffusion properties so that it is not 
dependent upon any encryption systems or software to provide cryptographic 
security to files. From the codes studied, Rabin’s IDA erasure code is suggested due 
to its higher resultant file size efficiencies compared to Shamir’s Secret Sharing. 
6.4 HANDLING METADATA 
In Krawczyk’s paper [60], he describes a space efficient secret sharing scheme 
combining Rabin’s IDA algorithm with a secure encryption scheme and a perfect 
secret sharing scheme together to form a cryptographically strong secure storage 
system. Specifically, the three subsystems work in conjunction as follows: 
Encrypt an original file with a random encryption key P, resulting in the encrypted 






. Use Shamir’s 






. For each 




 as a pair in that repository. Both IDA 
and Shamir’s is set to the same threshold configuration, such that only K pairs, K < N 
are necessary to recover the encrypted file E and the encryption key P. 
In Section 6.3.8 we’ve concluded that Rabin’s IDA algorithm itself exhibits both the 
Confusion and Diffusion properties, thus applying encryption prior to the use of IDA 
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on the file adds a layer of cryptographically security. Using Shamir’s to split the 
encryption key is an efficient application of the code, since the size of the encryption 
key is usually significantly smaller than the size of the file. The space inefficiency of 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing has much less impact in this set up compared to the gain of 
using its perfect cryptographic security property. 
In Krawczyk’s system, the encryption key and the encoding matrix used by IDA form 
the metadata used by the system. It is assumed that the encoding matrix is constant 
in their system (for example, always using a Vandermonde matrix), thus it does not 
need to be separately stored. However, since each fragment and key pair has a 
corresponding index, the index information must still be stored locally on the user’s 
computer. This presents one potential weakness of Krawczyk’s system. 
In our Framework, we want to cryptographically secure any and all metadata used. 
The metadata would also be stored in a file. Directly adopting Krawczyk’s approach 
of using Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme to secure and generate shares of the 
metadata file is a plausible solution. However, considering that the Framework needs 
to track these shares and their corresponding storage locations, the shares must be 
tracked by yet another index or metadata file. The problem thus propagates forward 
and remains unsolved. 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) storage systems present a solution to this problem of securing the 
metadata files while allowing them to tolerate against equipment failure, outages, or 
errors. Like P2P file sharing systems such as the Torrent networks, the principle 
ideas behind P2P storage systems is that a file would be stored in multiple peer 
locations in a peer-to-peer network. 
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The Framework encrypts the metadata with an encryption key which is chosen by the 
user, for example a SHA hash of a chosen password that the user can easily 
remember. Then, the encrypted metadata is distributed in a secure and private P2P 
network consisting of only the user’s devices and computers. Encrypted metadata 
files will duplicate and propagate through this network incrementally to every device 
in the network. To access a metadata file, the user simply has to enter his or her 
password and the Framework will decrypt the file accordingly. It is important that 
any implementation of the Framework never stores the user’s password or the hash 
of the user’s password in any temporary or permanent storage. To know that a file 
has been decrypted properly the system adds flag check bits when creating an 
unencrypted metadata file, so that when the file is properly decrypted, those bits and 
the file will pass corresponding tests. The only way for the system to decode 
properly is if the user enters a correct password. 
Secure P2P networks utilize encrypted communications links between every pair of 
devices, and can only be joined by authenticated and authorized user(s). If a user 
shares a file to another user, they will join that particular file’s P2P network and 
obtain a copy of the encrypted metadata file. Every message in a secure P2P network 
is checked for its authenticity, thus any unauthorized messages being sent through 
that network would simply be ignored by the peers in the network. Other forms of 
secure P2P networks and secure P2P file systems exist, an example is MIT’s Ivy P2P 
file system which is discussed in Section 7.3 [61]. 
It is assumed that the user will always have at least two devices online at any time, 
which is very common today due to the popular use of smart mobile phones. Devices 
such as smart phones which have limited processing power and storage capacities 
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only need to be involved in the metadata portion of the Framework, to save 
resources. They could also encode and decode files if the user desires; the 
Framework does not enforce any limitations in this aspect. 
6.5 CLOUD STORAGE SELECTION 
The choice of which Cloud storage service provider to use depends on four factors of 
economic pricing, service provider system security, reliability, and geographical 
location related risks. This section examines these four factors in detail and 
concludes with a prioritization of the factors. 
6.5.1 ECONOMIC PRICING FACTOR 
From an end user’s perspective, the internet service provider costs are often a fixed 
cost since service contract terms range from one year upwards to multiple years. The 
Framework, and any implemented systems, can only control the amount of data sent 
or retrieved from the internet in order to reduce the internet transmission costs 
shown earlier in Section 3.3.1. With enough pricing and usage information known, the 
Framework could suggest to users which other internet service providers would be 
more cost effective to establish contracts with. This function would have more 
impact towards business organizations than home users, since it would be exhaustive 
to tabulate all other uses of the internet by a home user. 
For any new files being uploaded to the Cloud for the first time, the Framework 
would pick a set of storage providers which has the lowest current storage costs. The 
number of providers can be customized according to user preferences and security 
requirements. Generally, the Framework would prefer taking full advantage of any 
free usage tiers from storage providers before incurring storage costs. This would 
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need to be balanced with the security requirements. Using this approach, the 
Framework would minimize all short term costs as file pieces newly uploaded to the 
Cloud would incur the lowest possible storage costs given the present pricing. In 
terms of internet transmission costs, only a forward upload cost would be incurred. 
In terms of long term storage costs, it can be expected that the storage providers 
would compete in terms of pricing and change according to the economic laws of 
demand, supply, and competition. In Section 5.4, point 7, it was mentioned that a 
user can face a dilemma of either paying higher long term costs by staying with an 
expensive provider, or pay an expensive transfer fee to move their files to the less 
expensive of the two Cloud storage providers for long term savings. The Framework 
lets the user reconstruct the file pieces stored on the expensive provider locally on 
their computer, and then upload these directly to the less expensive provider. The 
user doesn’t have to pay a download fee or an outbound data fee in order to take 
advantage of the savings. 
The Framework can model the re-upload costs as a fixed one-time fee which can be 
amortized over a period of time whereby the effective cost of storing the file in a 
cheaper provider is the same as staying with their current provider. We denote the 
upload fee X, the current provider’s monthly storage price in $/GB as A, the new 
provider’s monthly storage price as B, and the amortization period T in months. A 
simple equation can compute the value of T: 
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Equation 15 – Storage Cost Amortization Period with Single Upload 
  
 
     
 
Equation 15 assumes that the necessary file pieces for reconstructing a high cost file 
piece are already available locally on the user’s computer. If these pieces need to be 
downloaded, a slightly modified equation can be used to compute T. Let the number 
of pieces that need to be downloaded be K, and the download cost per piece be Y. T 
can be computed as follows: 
              
              
Equation 16 – Storage Cost Amortization Period with Downloads 
  
     
     
 
Anytime a pricing change occurs with any storage provider, the Framework can ask 
the user whether they expect to keep the file on the Cloud for longer than T months. 
If yes, the Framework can perform the necessary recomputation and upload tasks to 
move the relevant file piece(s) to a cheaper storage provider. Otherwise, the 
Framework will simply keep the file pieces in the existing set of providers until the 
user issues a delete command. 
Using Equation 15 and Equation 16, the Framework can minimize short term and 
long term storage costs as well as data transmission costs. 
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6.5.2 SERVICE PROVIDER SYSTEM SECURITY AND RELIABILITY FACTOR 
To deduce how secure and reliable a service provider is, the Framework can use data 
mining and web crawling techniques to find, track, and count the number of relevant 
security breaches, resolutions, and service outage events from trusted news websites 
to assign scores to each service provider. Generally, the more security breaches and 
service outages, the lower the score. The score would remain low until the issues 
have been resolved. Once scores are obtained, the Framework can select a subset of 
service providers who have the highest scores for this factor. 
The Framework cannot take a direct approach to test each provider’s systems for 
their security and reliability. Such tests can be viewed as malicious attacks, and can 
cause legal and financial liability for the user. Although data mining and web 
crawling technologies are interesting topics, they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
An appropriate data mining implementation would be necessary in the Framework to 
be able to deduce the scores and track the service providers for this factor. However, 
the use of erasure codes does allow the Framework to tolerate some losses of file 
pieces. 
6.5.3 SERVICE PROVIDER GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION FACTOR 
To deduce where are the geographical locations of the major data centers of each 
service provider, a data mining approach can be taken as well to look for information 
sources and data that indicate the locations. More importantly, the Framework 
should also obtain information about the world’s geography for risky geographical 
zones such as areas that are much more susceptible to earth quakes, hurricanes, 
volcano eruptions, and natural disasters. 
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From these two sets of data, the Framework can construct a topological map to select 
a set of service providers whom have data centers in geographical locations with very 
low probabilities of incurring a natural disaster. The Framework would also prioritize 
spreading out the data physically across the globe as much as possible. 
6.5.4 PRIORITIZING THE FACTORS 
The overall problem of choosing a set of Cloud storage providers could be thought of 
as an optimization problem of 1) minimizing storage and transmission costs, 2) 
finding and optimally moving data pieces to the most secure and reliable providers, 
and 3) distribute the file pieces to as sparse of geographical locations as possible, all 
at the same time.  
Erasure codes increases the total file size by the Resultant Size Factor, previously 
analyzed throughout Chapter 6. Thus, relative to simply uploading files to a Cloud, 
the Framework adds both transmission and storage costs. The Economic Pricing 
Factor guides the Framework towards minimizing total costs. 
The use of erasure codes by the Framework allows the complete loss and destruction 
of some file pieces. The Security and Reliability Factors guide the Framework towards 
more secure storage providers, thus reducing the probability of file pieces being lost 
or destroyed due to service provider mistakes, outages, and vulnerabilities. 
Lastly, the Geographical Location factor guides the Framework to reduce the 
probability of file pieces being lost due to natural disasters, or being the subject of 
unnecessary data privacy intrusion due to local laws and customs. 
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The main security benefits of the framework are provided by the use of the erasure 
codes, and the Security and Reliability Factor of this section would only reduce the 
risks by selecting record-wise more secure providers. If the selection criterion for 
providers was purely based on security alone, and costs were unimportant, then the 
framework can directly use the Security and Reliability Factor in its decision making 
to select the lowest risk providers. Otherwise, the selection problem could be 
modeled as a monetary cost minimization problem.  In this case, the prioritization 
order is as follows: 
1) The Economic Pricing Factor is the most important since minimizing costs must 
be part of the Framework to convince users and organizations to adopt this 
approach. Users and organizations can rationally accept the trade-off of an 
increased storage space requirement and related costs for the security and 
reliability benefits of this Framework. Knowing that the Framework will actively 
try to minimize costs will add to its value, and potentially increase the rate of 
adoption and use of the system.   
2) The Security and Reliability Factor is the second most important. Even though the 
Framework tolerates some losses, any loss of file pieces will involve computing 
the lost pieces and uploading them to another storage provider. Minimizing the 
probability of file pieces being lost also directly minimizes total costs. Ultimately, 
the security and reliability risks are controllable factors that a storage provider 
will constantly work to improve.  
3) The Geographical Location Factor is the least important since natural disasters are 
not controllable. We have mentioned previously in Section 3.1.5 that privacy 
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intrusion issues ultimately require political dialogue and new laws to be formed 
across geopolitical boundaries. 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the design of a system Framework which solves the Cloud 
storage problem. The Framework is a template design which software engineers and 
security system designers can take and further refine into a detailed implementation. 
The four major components of the Framework are the erasure code transformation 
system, the metadata handling system, the Cloud storage management system, and 
the encryption system. In turn, they are responsible for transforming the files into 
pieces, recording and synchronizing metadata files across the user’s devices, 
transferring the file pieces to and from the Cloud, and encrypting the files and file 
pieces throughout the Framework.  
We presented the set of metrics used to analyze erasure codes for their security 
properties and computational efficiencies, which interested researchers can apply to 
other erasure codes to determine their feasibility and relative performances. We then 
presented the detailed analysis of seven erasure codes using the metrics, along with a 
comparative analysis at the end. We concluded that for erasure codes which do not 
have the Confusion property, it would be best to pair those codes with an encryption 
system to secure the data within the files. We also showed that codes which have the 
Confusion property have encoding and decoding operations which are higher in time 
complexity than the codes which do not have the Confusion property. The best 
performing algorithms were LDPC, which does not have the Confusion property, and 
Rabin’s IDA, which does have the Confusion property.  
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We further analyzed the problem of securing the metadata files, showing how certain 
approaches in to this problem requires metadata files to protect metadata files in an 
essentially never ending chain. We proposed to encrypt the metadata file, and 
replicate it across a peer-to-peer network to the user’s devices to provide 
redundancy. 
Finally, we analyzed the problem of how to select a subset of Cloud storage providers 
from a master set. We defined three factors of economic pricing, service provider 
security and reliability, and service provider geography. We stated that if only 
security was the deciding factor, then the framework can use the security and 
reliability factor alone to select the least risky providers. Otherwise the factors are 
prioritized in the order presented, to let the Framework minimize the financial costs 
of using Cloud storage. 
The next chapter compares and relates the approach and Framework to existing 
remote storage paradigms, and analyzes the existing paradigms for their 





CHAPTER 7: COMPARISON TO EXISTING 
STORAGE PARADIGMS 
The Framework shares a number of similarities to existing methodologies and 
architectures with respect to the overall problem of storing data remotely in a secure 
and reliable fashion. It also has a number of key differences. This chapter examines 
the similarities and differences with three methodologies, namely a traditional Cloud 
storage system, a distributed file system, and a peer-to-peer file system. 
7.1 TRADITIONAL CLOUD STORAGE ARCHITECTURE 
In current Cloud storage systems, a user authenticates to a service provider’s 
systems to establish a secure internet connection to the service. A user’s files are 
securely sent to, and retrieved from the storage provider’s servers through the 
internet connection. Depending on the storage provider, various redundancy and 
encryption algorithms are applied on the files to secure and safely store the file on 
the Cloud. A visualization of this model is shown in Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9 – Traditional Cloud Storage Architecture 
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This architecture is most vulnerable at the authentication mechanism. The 
architecture is blind to who is accessing a user’s data when the authentication 
mechanism is compromised. Historically, the vast majority of attacks on Cloud 
storage providers have aimed at compromising the authentication mechanism [1] [2] 
[19] [30]. 
A secondary source of vulnerability has been the connections between the storage 
servers and the request handling servers within the Cloud storage provider’s internal 
networks. In many data centers around the world these connections are not 
encrypted as the design of the data center’s internal networks desired high efficiency, 
high transmission speed, and low latency. Encrypting connections within data center 
networks adds latency due to the computational time needed for encryption and 
decryption operations, reduces the speed as such secure connections require set up 
and tear down procedures, and reduces the efficiency as switch buffers and end 
nodes must queue data for longer periods of time waiting for these operations and 
procedures to finish in sequence. These types of unencrypted connections avail the 
system to attacks whereby the attacker wiretaps the connections and listens in on 
any and all data transmitted through the wire. As the storage nodes don’t necessarily 
need to be within the same buildings or even the same city, external physical access 
to these connections becomes easy for attackers. Although as such vulnerabilities are 
discovered, companies work hard to amend them. For example, high speed 
encryption hardware systems are being designed by companies to secure 
transmission links, claiming performances at line rates of up to 10Gbps [62]. 
Some Cloud storage providers only utilize replication algorithms to backup data, 
while others employ erasure code algorithms. Using simply replication is weaker 
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from a security point of view as the data is readily available to be read by an attacker 
as long as they gain access to the physical disks storing the data, however it is more 
efficient computationally as any requests for data can be serviced without the need 
to reconstruct or recompute the data. 
Some of the Cloud storage providers only replicate what is already available on a 
local storage space. These providers include Microsoft One Drive, Dropbox, and 
Google Drive when configured to synchronize with local files. When the local version 
is changed the system updates the version stored on the Cloud correspondingly, but 
when the local version is removed the Cloud version is also removed. Other storage 
providers act more alike a remote storage server where files could be uploaded and 
downloaded independent of local copies. These include Amazon’s S3, Google Drive 
when not configured to synchronize with local files. Users can synchronize the local 
and Cloud versions through the system when desired. 
The Framework borrows two important ideas from traditional Cloud storage 
architectures, firstly the use of erasure code algorithms, and secondly to use secured 
internet connections throughout all communication links. We’ve shown in Section 5.4 
how the Framework resolves the problems faced by traditional Cloud storage 
systems. 
7.2 DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS AND ARCHITECTURE 
In distributed file systems, a user connects to a remote storage server through, 
usually, a TCP/IP network to access their remote files. Most standard operating 
systems file operations such as copy, delete, create, move, open, close, and write 
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apply to these systems as well, and the user manages their files and folders on the 
remote server using the same user interfaces as they do on their own local computer. 
A popular distributed file system is the Network File System (NFS) invented by Sun 
Microsystems in the 1980s [63]. In Linux and UNIX based systems, NFS folders could 
be accessed by first using the mount command to connect to the folder. A more 
recent and advanced distributed file system is Red Hat’s GlusterFS, where the file 
system scales across many storage servers collectively considered as a virtual storage 
pool [64]. 
 
Figure 10 – GlusterFS Distributed File System Storage Architecture [64] 
The first Cloud storage systems were built upon distributed file systems servers, 
which makes the two very similar. However, users have direct access to their folders 
and files in the remote storage server, which allows them to issue operating systems 
level commands to control their files. If a user issues a delete command by accident 
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to their remote files, it is unlikely that there would be any way to recover the file 
unless the distributed file system had versioning systems in place. In Cloud storage 
systems these types of operations are interpreted and carried through the software 
system, which allows Cloud vendors to always create backups and versions to each 
and every operation on any file. Part of the work of utilizing a distributed file system 
is in the administration and management of all of the remote folders and drive 
partitions. The administrator of the system has control over the physical location 
where each user’s folders reside, which by extension implies the physical locations of 
all users’ data. In Cloud systems, due to the nature and size of the data encountered, 
often the specific physical location is determined by load and space balancing 
algorithms. The remote storage server usually exists within a local area network of 
the user’s home or corporate organization, rather than through the internet. 
Generally this means the user has control on the physical hardware of the storage 
servers, where as in the Cloud the users don’t have control over the hardware. If 
users wanted to utilize distributed file systems, they would also have to bear the 
costs of the equipment, maintenance, and management of the remote file servers 
they use. 
The Framework borrows the idea of carrying out file operations through a software 
system to allow for graceful recoveries from user mistakes, but at the same time 
strongly incorporates the notion of having much stronger control of the data, and 
where the data physically resides. Since the Framework ultimately uses Cloud storage 
providers to store users’ data, it can save the user from having to invest in storage 
equipment. 
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7.3 PEER-TO-PEER FILE SYSTEMS AND ARCHITECTURE 
Peer-to-peer file systems (P2P FS) originated as a research and experimental file 
system platform aimed to take advantage of the decentralized control and scalability 
advantages of peer-to-peer networks. One of the most prominent systems is MIT’s Ivy 
P2PFS [61]. Ivy is built on top of another tool called Chord [65]. Chord manages the 
coordination, and search of peers within the P2P network. Specifically, it assigns all 
participating peers into a Galois Field identifier circle, where all peers clockwise from 
the current peer is its successor peers. Each peer maintains a fixed table of 
immediate successor peers, which are indexed according to an interval range on the 
Galois Field. An example of this is shown below in Figure 11 for 3 peers with IDs of 
node 0, 1, and 3 respectively. Chord requires all peers in the P2P network to conform 
to this ordering specification, and whenever a peer joins or disconnects from the 
network, all other peers will update their successor tables. Peers are assigned into a 
node position based upon learning about information of one of the nodes in the ring 
through an external mechanism, such as from a P2P tracker server. Since every node 
in the ring knows its successors, a search for a peer within the network will simply 
traverse sufficient number of successor tables until it finds the peer in need. At a 
higher abstraction level, the location for a piece of data within the network is 
associated with a key which is mapped to the peer containing that data through a 
hash table that indexes the entire circle. Searches for data can simply be performed 
by searching using the corresponding key. 
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Figure 11 – Chord P2P Ring [65] 
Ivy is a log based file system in that every file related operation is written into log 
files. To read a file, the system must consult all logs for all operations related to the 
file, and then compute the results to generate the output file. To write or change a 
file, the system writes only to the log file residing with the user making the changes. 
Within this overall operation scheme, it uses the mechanisms of Chord to distribute 
the replicas of the logs to a keyed peer node and its successor nodes. In the case of a 
user performing a modification operation on a file, its updated log is replicated to 
the user’s successor peers. Ivy implements a number of other subsystems to ensure 
consistency of the logs, to resist attacks from outside the P2P network using 
encryption, and resist attacks within the P2P network through trust based log 
retrieval. In case of data corruption, Ivy also has tools that plausibly guess at the 
missing data blocks to assist in data recovery. 
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The premise of P2P file systems is that the decentralized control and access, along 
with sufficient numbers of participants in each network will be able to sustain a 
reasonable availability for any data stored in the network, and afford tolerance to 
equipment failures and outages through application of the Off-site Data Protection, 
and Replication principles. Compared to centralized storage systems like Cloud and 
its underlying distributed file systems, the probability of each node in the network to 
be offline is much higher, which makes P2P networks require much more replication 
than centralized systems. However, P2P networks such as Ivy are much more 
resistant to attacks from outside and inside the network, and the decentralized 
control makes it harder for an attacker to know where to begin attacking within a P2P 
network compared to centralized systems. The Ivy system also requires significant 
file-read overhead computation, since it has to retrieve all trusted logs through the 
network and compute the actual file from these logs. 
The Framework takes advantages of the ideas behind Ivy to distribute the metadata 
among a set of peers in a P2P network, each peer being a mobile device or computer 
that the user owns. While there is a relatively higher cost in retrieving and reading 
metadata, the metadata is expected to be small relative to the size of the actual files 
so the computation time is minimized. Changes to the metadata can propagate 
through the network to the other peers incrementally as each device connects and 
disconnects from the network. Alternatively, the system can adopt the approach of 
using Ivy’s read-all, write-local log system to store the metadata.  
However, Ivy’s file read cost overhead is too high for use for the actual data that a 
user would want to store in any off-site location. The Framework utilizes erasure 
code algorithms from the other storage systems in order to avoid this problem. 
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7.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the similarities and differences between the approach and 
Framework to existing remote storage paradigms, and analyzed the existing 
paradigms for their vulnerabilities as well as strengths. The Framework borrows the 
ideas of using erasure codes and secure internet connections from traditional  Cloud 
storage architectures. We’ve shown in previous chapters how the approach is 
superior to a traditional Cloud storage architecture, however it worth keeping in 
mind that efforts by a service provider to improve their services under the traditional 
architecture will benefit a user using a system implemented from our Framework.  
The distributed file system paradigm limits the user to essentially using network 
attached storage devices to back up their data, which involves heavy upfront costs, 
management and configuration work, and ultimately isn’t as secure as a true off-site 
back up that is placed far away from the user’s computing environment. However, 
distributed file systems allow users to have strong control over their files unlike 
traditional Cloud storage. The Framework borrows the idea of using a software 
system to perform file operations instead using operating system level commands in 
distributed file system architectures, in order to facilitate graceful recoveries from 
user mistakes. The Framework also borrows the idea of enforcing stronger control 
over the physical location of where data resides from distributed file systems. 
Finally, the peer-to-peer file system paradigm offers an interesting but high 
computational overhead cost means to store data among a set of peers in a P2P 
network. While the notion of decentralized control helps to add to the work required 
of attackers, there are many security challenges and vulnerabilities of using P2P 
networks as the backbone for a file system. Many of these challenges were 
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confronted by the research team at MIT in their course of designing the Ivy P2P file 
system. The Framework adopts the use of a simple peer-to-peer network to distribute 
the metadata files generated to mobile devices and computer that the user owns, to 
secure the metadata files and to add redundancy to the metadata so that it can 
tolerate outages and failures.  






CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
In an ever increasingly online and interconnected world where we are expecting 
exponential growths of the amount of data being generated, stored, and processed on 
the internet, it is of vital importance to ensure the safety, security, reliability, and 
privacy of any personal information stored online. 
The rise of Cloud Computing has given internet users a host of freedoms never 
enjoyed before, but comes with great risks for both users and the companies 
operating the Clouds. The analysis and Framework presented in this thesis showed, 
refined, and applied an effective approach based on the use of erasure codes. The 
Framework adds redundancy and cryptographic security to protect a user’s personal 
data. This helps users mitigate the risks of using Cloud storage whilst reaping and 
enhancing its benefits. Along the way, a set of erasure code analysis metrics was 
presented, which can be used to conduct further research of other erasure codes for 
their applicability to this problem. The economic constraints and problems of using 
Cloud storage was also analyzed, resulting in a set of prioritized factors to help users 
and storage systems select Cloud storage providers. 
The in-depth and comparative analysis of seven erasure codes showed that there’s a 
corresponding computational complexity trade-off where codes with better data 
security incur higher computational time complexities. Where codes shared the same 
mathematical principles, the allowed arrangements and configurations decided the 
efficiencies of each code. From the seven codes analyzed, two winners were chosen 
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due to their configuration flexibility and inherent security and efficiency properties. 
LDPC was chosen because it was fast and offered many configurations. Similarly, 
Rabin’s IDA was chosen because of its computational security and configuration 
flexibility. Ultimately, the choice of using a particular erasure code will depend on the 
security and efficiency preferences or needs of the user.  
The knowledge, analysis, and the Framework presented in this thesis enables 
interested researchers and software professionals to perform detailed design and 
implementation of an actual software system to help secure user data on the Cloud. 
The benefits would be tremendous to end users. 
As a research problem, the use of erasure codes is also a trade-off in that users must 
accept an increase in total storage costs in order to solve the Cloud storage 
problems. An even more ideal solution would find ways of minimizing or eliminating 
this increase. This is an open research challenge which might involve experimental 
research in erasure code designs, or the study and design of other kinds of data 
security systems. 
The author hopes that the knowledge collected and analyzed in this thesis would be 
synthesized further into effective educational materials to help inform the public 
about Cloud Computing, and to guide software professionals on the right path 
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